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I. STATUS
A.

NON-MARITAL

UNIONS

N the legislative sessions of 2001 and 2003, unsuccessful efforts were
made to enact a statute creating civil unions in Texas.' In the 2003
session section 6.204 was added to the Family Code to declare that
recognition of same sex unions is contrary to Texas public policy. 2 Else3
where adoptions of favorable proposals have been sparse.
B.

INFORMAL MARRIAGE

The couple whose dispute was before the court in Reynolds v. Reynolds4 were living together in Austin in early 1979, when they announced
to their families and friends that they were married. Several months later
the couple moved to Virginia where they were living in 1992, when the
woman abandoned the man, although both continued to live in Virginia.
After each had threatened to sue the other for divorce, the man brought
an action in Texas to declare that an informal marriage did not exist between them, and the woman brought a suit for divorce in Virginia. The
Texas court gave judgment for the man, and the woman appealed, though
the question of the court's jurisdiction to render the judgment had not
1. Tex. H.B. 496, 77th Leg., R.S. (2001). Tex. H.B. 38, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003).
2. Tex. S.B. 7, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003).
3. See Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, 53 SMU L. REV. 995,

996 n.3 (2000).
4. Reynolds v. Reynolds, 86 S.W.3d 272 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, no pet.).

2003]

HUSBAND AND WIFE

been raised. In its sua sponte consideration of jurisdiction to grant a declaratory judgment in such an instance, the Austin Court of Appeals first
inquired whether the relief sought by the petitioner "is germane to a justiciable controversy already within the district court's jurisdiction,"'5 that
is, related to a pending Texas cause of action between the parties or
clearly indicated imminent action which may be presumed. 6 But neither
situation existed and the parties were by then engaged in a Virginia proceeding in which that issue would have to be resolved. 7 The appellate
court therefore found that the Texas court did not have jurisdiction to
grant relief, though the court did not explain why Family Code section
6.307(b)(1) 8 was inapplicable. That provision allows a Texas court to declare a purported marriage void and an implication may be derived from
section 6.307(b) that since subdivisions (a) and (2) are stated in the alternative, no durational domicile or residence requirement needs to be met
by the petitioner. The reason that section 6.307 is inapplicable requires a
close reading of that section. It is implicit in the definition of an informal
marriage in section 2.401(b) that failure to prove the prerequisites defined there causes the alleged marriage to be void. But that definition is
in Chapter 2 of the Family Code whereas the provisions of section
6.307(a) apply only to provisions in Chapter 6, which refers only to the
two types of void marriages mentioned there: those that are prohibited by
rules of consanguinity and those that are bigamous. In Reynolds the
court also concluded that there was "no impediment to the Virginia
court's considering Texas law in determining whether [the woman] may
establish an informal [Texas] marriage," and at the time that such a marriage might have been contracted both parties were apparently domicilaries of Texas. 9 Because this matter was resolved on jurisdictional
grounds, the court did not consider the woman's reliance on section
2.401(b) 1 ° that the man's suit had not been not brought within two years
after their cohabitation had ceased.
In Wilson v. Estate of Williams1 the Waco appellate court held that,
because the contestant of the informal marriage had not raised the issue
of factual sufficiency of the evidence, she was barred on appeal from sug5. Id. at 276.
6. Id.
7. Id.

8. Tex. Fam, Code Ann. § 6.307 (Vernon 1998) (Jurisdiction to Declare Marriage
Void).
(a) Either party to a marriage made void by this chapter may sue to have the
marriage declared void, or the court may declare the marriage void in a collateral proceeding.
(b) The court may declare a marriage void only if:
(1) the purported marriage was contracted in this state; or
(2) either party is domiciled in this state.
(c) A suit to have a marriage declared void is a suit in rem, affecting the
status of the parties to the purported marriage.
9. Reynolds, 86 S.W.3d at 278 n.6.
10. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.401(b) (Vernon 1998).
11. Wilson v. Estate of Williams, 99 S.W.3d 640 (Tex. App.-Waco 2003, no pet. h.).
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gesting applicability of the limitation statute in effect at the time the informal marriage was alleged to have existed, rather than the limitation
statute in effect when the contest was filed and tried. But as a procedural
provision, section 2.401(b) would not have assisted her even if timely
12
pled.
In In re Hallgarth13 a couple had begun living together in 1985, while
the man was still married to another woman. He was divorced two years
later. Soon afterward, the couple decided to have children, represented
themselves to others as married, and participated in unsuccessful efforts
toward in vitro fertilization from 1988 to 1990 at very considerable expense. An effort toward other means of achieving parenthood also failed
in 1993. The couple finally separated in 1999. In the divorce proceeding
that ensued, the trial court found that an informal marriage existed, and
the man appealed on the ground that an agreement to marry had not
been shown. Direct evidence of the agreement to marry occurred in
1986, while (presumably without the woman's knowledge) the man's existing marriage was an impediment to their marriage. Whether at that
time there was evidence of the other two elements of an informal marriage, is not noted. If those elements had been proved and the couple
had continued to live together after the removal of the impediment of the
man's divorce, the informal marriage would have then become valid. 14 In
finding that an informal marriage existed when the petition for divorce
was filed, the Amarillo appellate court relied on the cumulative evidence
of the fifteen years that had passed after the agreement to conclude that
the marriage existed: fifteen years of cohabitation, use of the same name,
and representation of marriage to others including the officials of the hospitals in which the woman was treated. This analysis of the facts, though
extending over a far longer time than that examined by the Houston First
District Court of Appeals in Winfield v. Renfro,15 did not comply with the
conclusion there that all elements should have been present simultaneously. The Waco court's approach, however, is in harmony with the Texas
Supreme Court's decision in Russell v. Russell,16 holding that the agreement to marry might be inferred from the facts establishing the other two
12. See Mills v. Mest, 94 S.W.3d 72 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied) (dealing with little more than a dispute as to sufficiency of evidence to prove the
informal marriage).
13. In re Hallgarth, No. 07-01-0013-CV (Tex. App.-Amarillo May 29, 2001, no pet.)
(not designated for publication), 2001 WL 574833.
14. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.202 (Vernon 1998). See, e.g., Garduno v. Garduno, 760
S.W.2d 735 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, no writ).
15. Winfield v. Renfro, 821 S.W.2d 640, 645 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ
denied).
16. Russell v. Russell, 865 S.W.2d 929, 932 (Tex. 1993). In Ganesan v. Vallabhaneni,96
S.W.3d 345 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, pet. denied), the dispute centered on evidence offered to show that an informal marriage existed at a specific time, and in that respect it is
worthy of note. (Though such pleading may pose difficulty of proof, it may sometimes be
necessary to show that the marriage occurred before particular property was acquired.)
Mills, 94 S.W.3d at 72, dealt simply with an unsuccessful effort to marshal circumstantial
evidence to show an agreement to enter into an informal marriage.
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elements. On the other hand, in Mills v. Mest, 17 a close relationship that
ultimately blossomed into a ceremonial marriage was found to be insufficiently evidenced as an informal marriage. The proof showed that on
only one occasion had either the man or the woman ever held the other
out as a spouse, and the surmises of neighbors that the couple were married rested on evidence that might have been otherwise understood.
There was no direct evidence of an agreement to be married. The Corpus
Christi court concluded that Russell v. Russell18 requires "'more convincing' circumstantial proof" than was shown. 19
C.

JURISDICTION FOR DIVORCE

The couple in McAlister v. McAlister20 had lived in Guadalupe County,
but as differences had developed between them, the wife had rented an
apartment in Bexar County. She nevertheless went back and forth to
Guadalupe County from time to time, sometimes apparently for several
days. The couple engaged in lengthy negotiations towards reconciliation,
but the wife finally brought suit for divorce in Bexar County. Although
the husband was well aware of the suit, he was not served with citation.
He then sued for divorce in Guadalupe County, and the wife was served
with his petition. The Guadalupe County court denied the wife's plea in
abatement and granted a divorce. Before the San Antonio Court of Appeals, the wife argued that she was a resident of Bexar County, but in
light of all the testimony the appellate court concluded that she had residences in both counties sufficient to satisfy the durational residence requirement to sue in Bexar County. Though she had delayed having her
husband served with citation, she had apparently been motivated by a
hope of agreement between them. It was said to be customary in Bexar
County to delay citation of a respondent in order to achieve reconciliation, and thus the lack of service did not constitute undue delay on the
wife's part. 21 The appellate court therefore sustained the appeal on the
ground that the Bexar County court had dominant jurisdiction in the matter and the Guadalupe County court was therefore without jurisdiction to
grant the divorce.2 2 Without any indication of the extent or delay of citation said to have been within the standard of due diligence, this seems a
rather casual interpretation of Rule 47.7.23
In Dawson v. Dawson2 4 the husband brought suit in Texas but did not
serve his wife in Minnesota. She brought suit for divorce there, soon af17. Mills, 94 S.W.3d at 72.
18. Russell, 865 S.W.2d at 932.
19. Mills, 94 S.W.3d at 75.
20. McAlister v. McAlister, 75 S.W.3d 481, 482 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, pet.
denied).
21. Id. at 486.
22. Id. at 486-87.
23. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.7; see Gant v. DeLeon, 786 S.W.2d 259, 260 (Tex. 1990).
24. Dawson v. Dawson, No. 13-02-138-CV, No. 13-01-812-CV (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi Aug. 29, 2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication), 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS
6405.
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terward. The husband was served with citation and sought affirmative
relief from the Minnesota court. Hardly surprisingly in response to the
wife's special appearance in Texas to contest its jurisdiction, the Texas
court affirmed the lower court in reliance on Dawson-Austin v.
appellate
25
Austin.
In Cotton v. Cotton2 6 the appellate court considered a spouse's standing to appeal when the appellant had not been served with process, had
not waived citation, and did not participate in the trial in any manner.
The appeals court concluded 27 that without personal jurisdiction in such a
situation, the trial court lacked the power to enter a judgment for divorce
against the husband, even though the husband failed to assign lack of
jurisdiction in his appeal. 28 The husband had written a letter to the Attorney General, who had intervened on the part of the wife who was
seeking child support. The letter did not constitute the husband's general
29
appearance in the case in that it did not seek any action by the court.
D.

GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE

In In re Beach30 the wife filed a petition for divorce for insupportability, and the husband responded with an application for a
mandatory injunction requiring that the divorce court order the wife to
reconcile. The trial court rejected his request, and the husband appealed.
The Dallas Court of Appeals concluded that the wife's testimony that the
marriage was irreparable with no possibility of reconciliation constituted
a prima facie case for a divorce on the ground of insupportability and that
the husband's assertion that his wife had a "duty to reconcile is utterly
'31
without merit."
Proof of grounds for divorce was at issue before the Houston Fourteenth District Court of Appeals in Ratisseau v. Ratisseau, 32 as in Harmon
v. Harmon33 an appeal from a no-answer default divorce before the same
court. In Harmon, the court had concluded that "[a] defendant's failure
to appear or answer is taken as an admission of the allegations in the
plaintiff's petition. '34 In Ratisseau, the court corrected its prior error in
light of the clear provision of Family Code section 6.701 that "[i]n a suit
25. Dawson-Austin v. Dawson, 986 S.W.2d 319 (Tex. 1998).
26. Cotton v. Cotton, 57 S.W.3d 506 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001, no pet.).
27. Id. at 509-10.
28. Id. at 509-11 (citing St. Louis & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Hale, 109 Tex. 251, 206 S.W. 75
(1918), Smith v. Amarillo Hosp. Dist., 672 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1984, no
writ), and Toler v. Travis County Child Welfare Unit, 520 S.W.2d 834, 836 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
29. Id. at 511. How that letter had ultimately found its way to the district clerk's office
was not apparent in the record. Id.
30. In re Beach, 97 S.W.3d 706 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, no pet. h.).
31. Id. at 708.
32. Ratisseau v. Ratisseau, 44 S.W.3d 695 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet.
dism'd by agr.).
33. Harmon v. Harmon, 879 S.W.2d 213 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ
denied).
34. Id. at 217.
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for divorce, the petition may not be taken as confessed if the respondent
'35
does not file an answer."
In a recent study, 36 based on divorce statistics in some other states, it
was concluded that from the perspective of women, "repealing no fault
laws may cause harm as compared to passing reforms that will make marriages better, '37 such as proposed federal tax reforms 38 and allowing enforceable contracts between spouses concerning housework performed by
women. 3 9 The authors also favor "replicat[ion of] the patterns in marriage as closely as possible" 40 in custody rules, a result which Texas legislation has already sought to achieve by joint-custody provisions. 41
Other proposals for the reform of grounds for divorce continue to be
generated. Admiration for the Louisianian notion of "covenant marriage" 42 has provoked proposals 43 for adoption of that sort of rule in
Texas, but to no avail. Now a suggestion for the regeneration of the torts
of alienation of affection and criminal conversation has also been made in
Louisiana and elsewhere "to prevent adultery and save families."' 44 The
need to allege fault as a ground in order to assert fault as a matter to be
considered in division of the community estate, however, continues to be
35.

TEXAS FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.701 (Vernon 1998) (perpetuating TEX. FAM. CODE
§ 3.53 (1973), in effect when Harmon was decided). In Ratisseau, 44 S.W.3d at 697
the court relied on Roa v. Roa, 970 S.W.2d 163, 165 n.2 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1998, no
pet.), and Considine v. Considine, 726 S.W.2d 253 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, no writ). See
ANN.

Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, 48 SMU L. REV. 1225, 1263-64

(1995).
36. Margaret F. Brinig & Douglas W. Allen, "These Boots Are Made for Walking":
Why Most Divorce Filers Are Women, 2 AMER. LAW AND ECONOMICS REV. 126 (2000).
37. Id. at 159. Somewhat different views are presented in publications of the Institute
for American Values in New York. Its studies have been prepared by a group of family
scholars to promote strengthening the bonds of marriage in American society.
38. See Thomas R. White, II, Feds Propose New Treasury Reg to Resolve Tax Uncertainty in Marital Redemptions, 19 THE MATRIMONIAL STRATEGIST 1 (No. 9, 2001). For
further reliance on statistics see Lou Nitschke, Martial Status and Taxes: IrreconcilableDifferences?, 57 CoNo. Q. WEEKLY 2581 (1999).
39. Brinig & Allen, supra note 36, at 159 n.52.
40. Bing & Allen, supra note 36, at 160.
41. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 153.005, 153.133 (Vernon 2002).
42. LA. CIV. STAT. ANN. § 9:272 (2003). See Heather K. McShain, For Better or for
Worse? A Closer Look at Two Implicationsof Covenant Marriage,32 FAM. L.Q. 629 (1998).
This was the winning essay in the Howard C. Schwab Memorial Essay Contest for 1998.
The two implications discussed are the proposals for reinstitution of fault-based divorce
law and the impact that approach might have on recognition of the status of same-sex
couples.
43. In 1999 such a proposal was sponsored by seventeen members of the House of
Representatives but did not achieve passage. Tex. H.B. 350, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999). In
2001 and 2003 further proposals by Wohlgemoth of Bosque and Johnson Counties were
introduced without success. Tex. H.B. 352, 77th Leg., R.S. (2001); Tex. H.B. 1795, 78th
Leg., R.S. (2003).
After all, the "until death do us part" type of ceremonial marriage already exists in Texas
and it is common practice that the very serious vows exchanged by the couple are amply
witnessed-sometimes by a vast array of friends. If fault is to be assigned for not making
all this stronger than it is, it must fall ultimately upon the Congress of the Republic of
Texas in 1842 and succeeding Legislatures in allowing that the bonds of marriage may be
untied without very much, if any, recourse to the contract of marriage as such.
44. William R. Corbett, A Somewhat Modest Proposal to Prevent Adultery and Save
Families: Two Old Torts Looking for a New Career, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 985 (2002).
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argued. 45
II.
A.

CHARACTERIZATION OF MARITAL PROPERTY
PREMARITAL AND MARITAL PARTITIONS AND EXCHANGES

Prior to their marriage in 1992, the couple, whose marriage ended in
divorce in 1999, had entered into a property agreement when the woman
was forty, unmarried, and pregnant. In Osorno v. Osorno46 the wife who
contested the validity of the agreement asserted that her condition at the
time constituted duress and that she had therefore not entered into the
agreement voluntarily. The appellate court upheld the trial court's conclusion that the agreement was not invalid as the wife had not been under
47
any threat by her future husband-to-be to enter into it.
A bankruptcy case raised issues of the validity of a marital partition
and of present and prospective interests in community property so that
each spouse has, as separate property, that which would otherwise be a
part of the community estate. In In re Hinsley48 the federal Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals considered an attack by the bankruptcy trustee on a
marital partition entered into while the bankrupt-husband and his estranged wife were attempting to reconcile their marital differences. The
court concluded that the marital partition was void as to the wife. 49 Using the badges of fraud of the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act to
cover facts which the wife had failed to explain, the court concluded that
the partition removing substantial assets from the reach of the husband's
creditors was not for fair equivalent value received by the wife with respect to the creditors' claims. 50 The court also intimated that failure of
the husband to divulge the existence of the partition to his creditors
somehow barred the running of the statute of limitations in favor of his
wife's interest. The court seems to have held that for purposes of creditors' claims of fraudulent transfer against one of the spouses, the other
spouse need not have an intent to defraud creditors in entering into the
partition. Although the context of a debtor-creditor dispute was certainly
paramount in the court's consideration of this case, the court nonetheless
raised the question of the need for a showing of a mutual intent to defraud creditors with respect to the validity of the partition of other contexts. In Painewebber,Inc. v. Murray5 l the issue the before the court was
whether a term of a premarital agreement in which the wife waived her
45. See Phillips v. Phillips, 75 S.W.3d 564 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2002, no pet.) (discussed infra at notes 276-80). See also Martel v. Martel, No. 05-99-00177-CV (Tex. App.Dallas Aug. 31, 2001, no pet.) (not designated for publication), 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS
2691, discussed infra at notes 293-97.
46. Osorno v. Osorno, 76 S.W.3d 509 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.).
47. Id. at 541 (citing In re Dawley, 551 P. 2d 323, 331 (Cal. 1976), which dealt with a
pre-marital agreement "signed under the pressure of unplanned pregnancy.").
48. In re Hinsley, 20t F.3d 638 (5th Cir. 2000).
49. Id. at 643.
50. Id. at 642 (citing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.005(b)).
51. Painewebber, Inc. v. Murray, 260 B.R. 815 (E.D. Tex. 2001). See text infra at notes
165-68.
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homestead rights in the husband's separate property affected his claim to
a homestead as the head of a family. The federal district court by a very
liberal interpretation of the nature of the particular homestead claim held
that the husband's claim of two hundred acres as a rural homestead was
52
not so affected.
B. TRACING
The community presumption 53 applied with the severity required by
the clear and convincing evidence rule 54 supplies an easy answer to a very
large number of tracing questions when the evidence of the separate
character of particular property is unavailable or insufficiently explained.
Several cases illustrate this evidentiary reality. In Gaides v. Gaides55 the
wife asserted that shares of stock in brokerage accounts were her separate property. 56 Though she was able to show that separate property
went into those accounts, she could not show that the increments to the
accounts were all of a separate character, 57 and segregating the community additions to particular shares was therefore impossible. In dealing
with the characterization of an insurance policy, 58 the court devoted inor-

dinate attention to distinguish two federal tax cases. 59 In concluding that
a written transfer of a community insurance policy by one spouse to the
other spouse "as owner" (without more) did not create a countervailing
presumption of gift 60 which would not be overcome by the transferorspouse's mere denial of his intention to make a gift. 61 Though legislation

has been suggested that a mere transfer of community property during
marriage by one spouse to the other without any recital as to ownership is
presumed to be intended as a change in management rather than ownership, such legislation would not apply in a situation like this one which
included a recital of ownership. In this instance estoppel by the parole
evidence rule is decisive, 62 and to say as the court does 63 that the wife
relied only on cases involving conveyances of real property seems a resort
to sophistry. In fact a reasonable argument may be advanced in such a
dispute that the husband's evidence of his intent is inadmissable. 64 In In
52. Id. at 827.

53. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.003(a) (Vernon 1998).
54. Id. § 3.003(b).
55. Gaides v. Gaides, No. 14-99-0017-2-CV (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] May 3,
2001, pet. denied) (not designated for publication), 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 2930.
56. Id. at *15.
57. Id. at *17.
58. Id. at *26.
59. Parson v. United States, 460 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1972); Freedman v. United States,
382 F.2d 742 (5th Cir. 1967).
60. Story v. Marshall, 24 Tex. 305 (1859).
61. Gaides, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 2930, at *24-26.
62. Messer v. Johnson, 422 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. 1968); Lindsay v. Clayman, 151 Tex. 593,
254 S.W.2d 777 (1952).
63. Gaides, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 2930, at *25.
64. Messer, 422 S.W.2d at 912; Blanchard v. Blanchard, 293 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1956, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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re Baggett6 5 the Amarillo Court of Appeals found that the husband had
failed to trace stock splits of what were initially separate shares of stock
because some part of the stock splits resulted from reinvestment of community cash dividends into shares which were subsequently split. As in
Gaides the husband's evidence of tracing was unsuccessful in showing
66
precise amounts of separate stock held.
A husband's evidence failed once more in Evans v. Evans,6 7 where in
offering his income tax returns as his only proof of a separate business
interest, he was unable to show a clear mutation of a separate interest,
though a properly evidenced request for findings of fact and conclusions
of law 68 and the finding which might have been made could have aided
his argument on appeal.
In determining the separate and community elements of various types
of profit-sharing plans and other types of contributory retirement plans in
which an employee has become a member prior to marriage and continues as a member during marriage, 69 appellate courts have followed the
easy approach of the Houston First District Court of Appeals in Hatteberg v. Hatteberg 70 by merely subtracting the pre-marital value of the
interest from that at the end of the marriage in order to segregate (and
thus value) the separate interest of the employee. As is pointed out in a
recent reanalysis, 71 this method of characterization merely measures the
overall increase in the value of the participant's account during marriage
and fails to identify investments and mutations of investments which have
been held within the account since before the marriage. Though the old
mode of characterization may have been an appropriate means of identifying and valuing proportionate separate and community interests in such
plans in past times, new forms of contributory plans and changed investment practices over the last fifteen years have made that mode of characterization in a great many defined contribution plans inappropriate today.
Under current practice, most defined contribution plans are invested in
stocks rather than in interest-bearing accounts (commonly those operated
by life insurance companies) as was the earlier practice. With this shift in
65. In re Baggett, No. 07-02-0087-CV (Tex. App.-Amarillo Sept. 24, 2002, no pet.)
(not designated for publication), 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 6858.
66. Id. at *10.
67. Evans v. Evans, No. 03-01-00281-CV (Tex. App.-Austin June 31, 2002, no pet.)
(not designated for publication), 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 4461.
68. Id. at *2.
69. For example, plans under I.R.C. § 401(k) and employees stock option plans
(ESOPs).
70. Hatteberg v. Hatteberg, 933 S.W.2d 522 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no
writ). See also, Pelzig v. Berkebile, 931 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1996, no
writ). In the recent reappraisal of this approach by Wingate and Fowler, the old line of
authority is said to stem from lglinsky v. Iglinsky, 735 S.W.2d 536 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1987,
no writ), though it is hard to discern a clear expression of that technique there. The court
there merely seems to say that the rule in Berry v. Berry, 647 S.W.2d 945, 947 (Tex. 1983),
should be applied only to that part of the fund not contributed from the employee's separate property, lglisky, 735 S.W.2d at 538, as the critics recommend.
71. James M. Wingate & Dawn E. Fowler, Divestiture of Separate Property Is Alive
and Well in Texas, 65 TEX. B.J. 584 (2002).
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investment practices, characterization and valuation of marital assets in
such plans is more often appropriately achieved by tracing existing assets
which are the same as, or are mutations from, premarital investments in
the plan. If this tracing approach is not feasible, the method employed in
characterizing and valuing interests in defined benefit plans seems
72
appropriate.
That which is earned by a spouse while the couple is domiciled in a
common-law state prior to moving to Texas is that spouse's separate
property. Under section 7.002, 73 however, that property is nonetheless
divisible on divorce as community property. The Corpus Christi Court of
Appeals' explanation of this point in Zorilla v. Wahid74 may still be somewhat misleading. While the couple lived in New York, the wife had put
aside a substantial sum designated along with its income as a fund for
their children's education. Presumably that fund in time had produced
further income included in the fund after the couple moved to Texas, and
nothing was said in the opinion about any attempts to trace the additions
to the separate property in the fund. The court merely applied the community presumption 7 5 to conclude that the entire fund was community
property, at least for the purpose of division of the fund on divorce.
Though the court cited Ismail v. Ismail,76 no mention was made of the
terms controlling investment of the fund by which additions to the fund
and their ultimate disposition might have been determined. In the apparent absence of argument on such matters, the court merely applied the
77
community presumption to the entire fund on divorce.
78
In Zagorski v. Zagorski tracing of separate assets in a bank account
prior to marriage was achieved by applying "the community propertyout-first" method to the account wholly under the husband's control and
in which he commingled community funds during the marriage. As has
been so often pointed out, "the community property-out-first" approach
is not an appropriate means of tracing in these circumstances when the
spouse mixes his own separate funds in a community property account. 79
In a divorce context once the marital estates have been identified, the
community estate must be evaluated with some care though only a general notion of the value of the spouses' separate estates may be necessary
for the division of the community estate. Marketability of shares of stock
72. Id. at 591-92.
73. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 7.002 (Vernon 1998).
74. Zorilla v. Wahid, 83 S.W.3d 247, 251 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.).
75. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.003(a) (Vernon 1998).
76. Ismail v. Ismail, 702 S.W.2d 216, 219 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, writ

ref'd n.r.e.). This was another somewhat confusing case involving a foreign domiciliary
owning Texas realty as well as movables and immovables in Egypt where the couple had

previously lived. See Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, 41 Sw. L.J. 33,
34 1987).
77. Zorilla, 83 S.W.3d at 251.
78. Zagorski v. Zagorski, No. 14-99-01044-CV (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] May
23, 2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication), 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 3721.
79. See, e.g., Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, 55 SMU L. REV.
1035, 1048-49 (2002).
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present some difficulty in their valuation, however. In R. V.K. v. L.L.K.8 0

the appellate court concluded that a buy-sell agreement between the husband and other shareholders of a professional corporation (with agreed
81

"significant restrictions on the marketability of the stock" that instance)
was a proper factor in determining the value of the stock along with other
evidence.

82

C.

RETIREMENT PLANS

By a strict reading of Egelhoff v. Egelhoff8 3 the Texas Supreme Court
in 2001 concluded in Barnett v. Barnett84 that a husband's handling of a

term life insurance policy (acquired by him during marriage as an employment benefit) was controlled by the Employment Retirement In-

come Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) rather than by Texas law. Thus, the
husband's designation of his estate as beneficiary of the policy was not
subject to any claim of his widow in favor of the community estate. In
Heggy v. American Trading Employee Retirement Account Plan,85 de-

cided by the Houston Fourteenth District Court of Appeals prior to the
decision in Barnett, the employee-husband's ex-wife was listed as the ben-

eficiary of any amounts remaining in his retirement account at his death,
and after his death his second wife unsuccessfully sought those benefits
claimed by the ex-wife, who had waived any interest in the husband's

retirement benefits in their divorce settlement. Even so, the controlling
factor in the disposition of the retirement benefits under ERISA was the
designation of the plan-beneficiary by the employee spouse.
Several bankruptcy cases from other jurisdictions have dealt with the
effects of federal non-bankruptcy legislation in characterizing funds in a

pension plan maintained for an employee-spouse. These cases dealt with
debtors who were the former spouses of a pensioner-spouse, and in each

case the court held that the federal statute governing these property interests had preempted the process of characterization in favor of the nondebtor spouse. Thus no interest in the non-debtor's pension plan became

part of the bankruptcy estate of the debtor-ex-spouse, 8 6 and that interest

80. R.V.K. v. L.L.K., No. 04-01-0345-CV, 2003 Texas App. LEXIS 1770 (Tex. App.San Antonio Feb. 28, 2002, no pet. h.).
81. Id. at *18.
82. Id. For some other factors see Charles P. Kindregan, Jr. & Patricia A. Kindregan,
Unexercised Stock Options and Marital Dissolution, 34 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 227 (2001);
David S. Rosettenstein, The ALI Proposalsand the Distributionof Stock Options and Restricted Stock on Divorce: The Risks of Theory Meet the Theory of Risks, 8 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 243 (2002); David S. Rosettenstein, Exploring the Uses of the Time Rule in
the Distribution of Stock Options on Divorce, 35 FAM. L.Q. 263 (2001).
83. Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141 (2001) (discussed in Joseph W. M0Knight, 55
SMU L. REV. 1035, 1067 (2002)). See Comment, Jonathan Dotson, Egelhoff v. Egelhoff:
The Supreme Court's Latest Attempt to Clarify ERISA Preemption and the Decision's Effect on Texas State Law, 54 BAYLOR L. REV. 503 (2002).
84. Barnett v. Barnett, 67 S.W.3d 107 (Tex. 2001).
85. Heggy v. Am. Trading Employee Retirement Account Plan, 56 S.W.3d 280 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.).
86. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (c)(2) (2000).
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was not liable for the debtor-ex-spouse's bankruptcy debts. In terms of
Texas law, these decisions hold by analogy that the debtor-spouse has no
interest in the non-debtor spouse's retirement plan even if the debtorspouse had no specific interest in the plan itself but has been awarded a
qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) to allow disbursements from
the fund. Insofar as these cases properly derive their authority from ERISA 87 and the federal Supreme Court's decisions construing it,88 these
decisions are unexceptionable.8 9 But if the decisions 90 derive their authority from the Uniformed Services Former Spouse's Protection Act
(USFSPA) and other federal acts similar to it, their authority is not applicable in Texas by analogy because the latter type of act allows a divorce
court to apply state law in dividing an interest in the retirement plan. But
the share of the non-pensioner spouse may be very difficult to compute in
a bankruptcy context.
D.

REIMBURSEMENT

In 2001 the Texas Legislature defined a particular type of reimbursement as arising when an "economic contribution" has been made by one
marital estate to discharge a secured interest in the other marital estate. 91
In Langston v. Langston92 the husband, though cited with the wife's petition, failed to answer or to appear at the trial. The husband, nevertheless,
appealed when his separate realty was awarded to his wife. The decree
had spelled out his interest in some detail. Prior to the marriage the husband had acquired a house, which during the marriage the couple subjected to a home equity loan. Due to a depressed real estate market at
the time of the divorce, the amount of the lien on the property exceeded
the value of the realty itself. The divorce court therefore awarded the
house subject to the community debt to the wife and directed her to discharge the lien. In granting the husband's appeal, the Eastland Court of
Appeals pointed out that the claim for economic contribution created by
the community obligation cannot affect the separate title to the realty
under the inception of title doctrine: 93 "A claim for economic contribution does not create an ownership interest in the property; it merely creates a claim against the property of the benefited estate which matures
87. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000).
88. See Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833 (1997); Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753
(1992).
89. See In re Nelson, 274 B.R. 789 (8th Cir. B.A.P. 2002). But those cases that purport to be based on the authority of a QDRO but fall outside the scope of ERISA seem to
be wrongly decided. In re Anderson, 269 B.R. 27 (8th Cir. B.A.P. 2001); In re Hageman,
260 B.R. 852 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio, 2001); In re Johnston, 218 B.R. 813 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1998).
90. Whetzal v. Alderson, 32 F.3d 1302 (8th Cir. 1994); In re Seddon, 255 B.R. 815
(Bankr. W.D. N.C. 2000).
91. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.401.401, 3.406.410, 7.002 (Vernon Supp. 2003). See
Joseph W. MKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, 55 SMU L. REV. 1035, 1049-52
(2002).
92. Langston v. Langston, 82 S.W.3d 686 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2002, no pet.).
93. Id. at 689 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.404(a) (Vernon 2003)).
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upon the termination of the marriage. ' 94 The court relied specifically on
the language of Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer that "[i]f one spouse's separate
property may by a divorce decree be changed from the separate property
of the one spouse into the separate property of the other, there is a type
of separate property which is not embraced within the constitutional defi95
nition of the term."
The divorce court "shall" therefore impose (that is, adjudicate the extent of) "an equitable lien,"' 96 which had already arisen by operation of
law. The legal lien defined by the divorce decree can then be foreclosed,
and in the meantime, constructive notice of the lien can be achieved by
recordation of the divorce decree.
When making a reimbursement claim on the part of the community
estate, that claim must be substantiated by proof of the separate or community character of the benefit rendered and its amount. Though the
court in In re Vineyard97 dealt mainly with procedural matters involved in
a prisoner's rights as a party to a divorce proceeding, a comment by the
court concerning reimbursement nevertheless needs clarification. The
facts with regard to this point are not clear. The husband seems to have
asserted a right to reimbursement for payment of some of his wife's
debts, incurred prior to marriage. 98 The time of payment, which is allimportant in this instance, is not indicated. If the payment was made
prior to marriage, as was presumably the case, the rules of marital reimbursement do not apply. Depending on the circumstances the payment
might have created a debt or constituted a gift. On the other hand if the
payment was made during marriage, there is no presumption of gift under
the law of marital reimbursement, though the payment may have the
same consequences of a gift if the right of reimbursement is not asserted
and proved.
E.

RECOVERY FOR PERSONAL INJURY AND WRONGFUL DEATH

The husband's undifferentiated personal injury recovery was claimed
by him in Flores v. Flores 99 as his separate property, at least in part. The
husband had agreed to a lump sum settlement for his injury, with part of
which he had purchased an annuity from which he received monthly payments. There was no evidence before the divorce court to show that any
part of the recovery was separate property and in most cases of this kind,
no such evidence can be produced. Sometimes, however, far-sighted injury-litigation-planning may be richly rewarding to the injured
94. Id. (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.404(b) (Vernon 2003)).
95. Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Tex. 1977).
96. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.406 (Vernon 2003).
97. In re Vineyard, No. 07-01-0460-CV (Tex. App.-Amarillo June 21, 2002, pet. denied) (not designated for publication), 2002 WL 1357681 at *1.
98. Id. at *9.
99. Flores v. Flores, No. 14-00-00536-CV (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist] July 26,
2001, no pet.) (not designated for publication), 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 4947.
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plaintiff.10 0
In Trostle v. Trostle'0 ' the widow (individually and as independent executrix) and one son of the deceased husband-father had sued for the
decedent's wrongful death and survival damages on their own behalf and
that of the estate and testamentary trusts created by the decedent, but
there was no recovery of survival damages in the absence of evidence to
support that cause of action. Another son of the decedent then brought
suit against the successful plaintiffs for a portion of the recovery for
wrongful death and damages for his exclusion as a claimant for survival
damages. The trial court rejected the plaintiff's claims and he appealed.
The Amarillo appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
The court concluded (as had the trial court) that the appellant had knowledge of the filing of the suit but did not choose to join in it, and therefore
he had no right to complain of his non-joinder as a beneficiary of the
102
estate.
III.

MANAGEMENT AND LIABILITY OF
MARITAL PROPERTY

A.

MANAGEMENT OF MARITAL PROPERTY

10 3

In re McCloy
dealt with a husband's 1998 involuntary bankruptcy
proceeding in which his wife asserted a claim as a creditor. Both the
debtor and his wife, however, asserted that the court lacked jurisdiction
over any claim against certain property belonging to the wife. In 1975 the
property in issue had been bought by the husband with community funds
in his own name. In 1987, the husband again acting alone, gave a lien on
that property to a lender as security for a loan. In 1992, and again in
1994, the husband transferred his equity in the same property as security
for further loans. In 1992 the wife had become voluntarily bankrupt and
claimed the particular property as community property but did not give
her husband's creditor notice as she did not regard him as a creditor.
Unaware of the wife's claim to an interest in the property, the creditor
foreclosed his liens on the property in 1997, and the husband sued to set
aside the foreclosure. A petition for involuntary bankruptcy was then
filed against the husband by another creditor. In the meantime, the husband had executed two successive leases on the land to his son, and the
wife's name appeared on one of those leases. The wife and son were in
possession of the land. The bankruptcy court found that the land in issue
was community property but solely managed by the husband. The court
then approved a settlement of the trustee with the creditor, and the husband and wife appealed to the federal Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals asserting that property in question was jointly managed community
property and was therefore beyond the subject matter jurisdiction of the
100. See Joseph W. M'Knight, Family Law, Sw. L.J. 66, 71-72 (1974).
101. Trostle v. Trostle, 77 S.W.3d 908 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2002, no pet.).
102. Id. at 915-17.
103. In re McCloy, 296 F.3d 370 (5th Cir. 2002).
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bankruptcy court. In finding that the property was subject to the husband's sole management, the court relied particularly on the provisions of
Section 3.104(a) (clarified in 1999) that "property is presumed to be subject to the sole management, control and disposition of a spouse if it is
held in that spouse's name ....
-104
The course of conduct of the parties
confirmed that conclusion and thus the bankruptcy court's exercise of jurisdiction. The federal appellate court distinguished Williams v. Portland
State Bank, 10 5 relied on by the couple, on the ground that in Williams the
creditor had actual notice of the contesting spouse's lack of sole authority
to manage the land, although in this instance the creditor did not have
such notice. 10 6 But even if the land had been subject to joint management of the spouses, the property would have been subject to the husband's creditors claims. In that eventuality, however, the husband's sole
disposition of the property would have been ineffective except as to a
creditor without notice in reliance on Section 3.104(a).
The disposition of marital property at death sometimes calls for the
application of the doctrine of equitable election, the application of which
is not often encountered except as between a surviving spouse and a deceased spouse's testate takers. The rule is that if a decedent disposes of
the property of another (of the other spouse or someone else) by will as
though owned by the testator and also makes a testamentary disposition
in favor of that person, the person both benefited and deprived is forced
to elect between the benefiting donation and the deprivation of the property. 10 7 The dispute in In re Estate of McFatter 0 8 dealt with a 1968 will
made jointly by a husband and wife. The will provided that the survivor
of them would take the full estates of both. There was no further dispositive provision in the will. After the husband's death in 1998 the widow,
having the entire estate, made another will in 2001 in favor of named
persons not her heirs at law. The widow's intestate heirs sought probate
of the first will and the takers under the second will claimed under the
later will. The trial court accepted the argument of the proponents of the
first will that it was contractual in nature and therefore barred the widow
as survivor from making a further effective will covering the estates of
both spouses. Though the first will was, of course, contracted mutually in
favoring the survivor, it went no further than vesting the entire estate in
the widow. The issue between the claimants under the two wills was
whether there was any element of contract dealing with the further disposition of the estate after the death of the survivor. There was none. What
the proponent of the first will argued with respect to the contractual nature of the first will was beside the point, as was his argument that the
widow was somehow put to an equitable election concerning the will's
104. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.104(a) (Vernon 1998).

105. Williams v. Portland State Bank, 514 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1974,
writ dism'd).
106. McCloy, 296 F.3d at 374-75.
107. See Wright v. Wright, 154 Tex. 138, 274 S.W.2d 670 (1955).
108. In re McFatter, 94 S.W.3d 729 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, no pet. h.).
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terms. The terms of the first will were "absolute and unconditional" in
favor of the survivor. 10 9 There was therefore nothing that might pass
conditionally.'1 0 The argument that an election would arise in this situation was based on the notion that in the first will the husband had purported to dispose of his wife's estate and bequeathed his estate to her,
therefore putting her to an election. That argument was put to rest by the
will's mutual quality and the fact that the will may be otherwise interpreted. The wife had in effect made a similar provision in favor of the
husband if he should survive her. That was the end of it.11

B.
1.

LIABILITY OF MARITAL PROPERTY

Liability of a Debtor-Spouse

Because liability of marital property is defined in terms of the management powers of the respective spouses, the definition of liability generally
follows that of management. The Family Code defines liability of a
spouse as falling on that spouse's separate property, his or her solely
managed community property, and all of the jointly managed community
property.1 1 2 Disputes between spouses (or their privies) as to liability
occur in one of the two contexts of dissolution of marriage: by divorce (or
annulment) or by death of a spouse. In disputes between spouses on the
one hand and their creditors on the other, the same question must be
resolved when a creditor of one of them seeks recourse to a marital estate
within the orderly confines of bankruptcy or simply by enforcement of
state collection remedies. Disputes between spouses in divorce or annulment infrequently involve their creditors directly because creditors do not
have notice of their dispute, but when a marriage is dissolved by death or
bankruptcy, all claimants should have notice to engage in the fray.
In In re Nahatt 1 3 the husband had filed a Chapter 13 petition in bankruptcy court in which his wife did not join. Most of the debtor-husband's
debts were incurred on credit cards issued to him, and his wife had borrowed against her § 401(k) retirement plan and from her credit union for
what were said to be "community purposes." ' 1 4 The purposes for which
the credit card liabilities were incurred were not shown. The trustee in
bankruptcy argued that the future income of both spouses should be
pooled and that their creditors should be similarly treated in preparing
the Chapter 13 plan because "allowing [the wife] to pay debts she personally incurred before dedicating the balance of her income to the Plan is
unfair and inequitable."' 1 5 Put somewhat differently, the trustee seem109. Id. at 733.
110. Id.
111. The court also mentioned City of Corpus Christi v. Coleman, 262 S.W.2d 790 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1953, no writ.), in relation to a will that was not contractual though
jointly made and also did not provoke an election.
112. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.202(a)-(c) (Vernon 1998).
113. In re Nahat, 278 B.R. 108 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002).
114. Id. at 111.
115. Id.
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ingly raised the question whether a non-debtor spouse's income should
be considered and included in the debtor's spouse's Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan.'1 6 The court put these irrelevant arguments aside. Despite
substantial case law elsewhere requiring inclusion of the non-debtorspouse's income 1 7 and putting aside the student loan cases as inapposite 1 8,the bankruptcy court concluded that neither bankruptcy law nor
Texas law allows inclusion of the wife's debtor or post-petition earnings in
the husband Chapter 13 plan. 11 9 The wife's post-petition income is
clearly not part of the debtor's bankruptcy estate, 120 and the Bankruptcy
Code pointedly refers to the "debtor's projected disposable income" 12 '
and "property that the debtor acquires after the commencement of the
case" 22 as included in the plan. Further, "[i]f a Chapter 13 case cannot
be commenced involuntarily, it follows that it is contrary to public policy
to force a debtor's spouse to participate on equal terms with the debtor in
the plan."' 123 The court also pointed out that under Texas law 124 the community property solely managed by the wife is not liable for the husband's non-tortious debts.
The same court in In re Arturo Rodriguez 2 5 considered a dispute arising out of an agreed judgment in a garnishment proceeding prior to the
debtor-couple's filing for bankruptcy immediately after the garnishment
writ was levied. A month before the hearing on the writ, the debtors had
filed a motion to dissolve the writ of garnishment. The debtors then
brought a turnover action against the garnishee asserting that the garnished funds were part of their bankruptcy estate. 2 6 The creditors argued that pursuant to the agreed judgment, the title to the garnished
property had passed to the garnishor prior to the filing of the bankruptcy
petition. Because the writ of garnishment is not self-executing and a writ
of execution cannot issue until thirty days has run from the time the judgment is signed, the title to the garnished property did not pass to the
garnishing creditor. The bankruptcy petition had been filed during the
thirty day period and at that time the bankruptcy estate, consisting of all
legal or equitable interests of the debtors, was created. 127 Thus again, the
debtors had the advantage of the effect of section 522(f)(1) of the Bank116. Id.
117. Id. at 11-12 (citing Robert B. Chapman, Coverture and Cooperation:The Firm, the
Market, and the Substantive Consolidation of Married Debtors, 17 BANKR. DEV. J. 105, 117

(2000).

118.
119.
120.
121.
at 114.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id.
Id. at 112-17.
11 U.S.C. § 541 (2000).
11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B) (2000) (emphasis added by the court), Nahat, 278 B.R.
11 U.S.C. § 1306(a) (emphasis again added by the court), Nahat, 278 B.R. at 113.
Nahat, 278 B.R. at 115.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.102(b)(2) (Vernon 1998).
In re Arturo Rodriguez, 278 B.R. 749 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002).
11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1).
Arturo Rodiguez, 278 B.R. at 753 (citing id.).
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ruptcy Code 128 to remove any judicial lien impairing their exemption.
The creditors argued that if their lien was avoided and the debtors were
thereby allowed access to the funds impounded, nothing would prevent
the debtors from dismissing the case under section 1307(b) 129 of the
Bankruptcy Code and spending the liquid funds. The court answered this
argument by saying that if the debtors should dismiss their case, the creditor's lien would be reinstated and the creditor could then proceed in a
Texas court to protect the funds. The court also pointed out that once the
bankruptcy proceeding was underway the debtors may expend exempt
130
funds anyway.
In Womack-Humphreys Architects, Inc. v. Barrasso13 ' the Eastland appellate court concluded that an alien, non-resident husband had no homestead rights in a Texas home bought by him prior to his marriage and
visited but not occupied or claimed by him as a homestead. The property
was therefore subject to foreclosure of a valid lien, subject to the homestead rights of his wife who was in residence. But the wife was not entitled to an injunction to deter the foreclosure.' 32 Though the appellate
court said that the wife had a homestead interest in the property, 133 the
court did not explain how that right might survive the lien holder's
foreclosure.
2.

Liability of a Surviving Spouse

In Patel v. Kuciemba 134 the debtor-husband's creditors sought to enforce his liability against his widow for the payment of delinquent notes
related to the decedent's business to which the widow was not a party and
of which the widow was totally unaware. The creditor's contention was
that the widow had given her husband authority to act for her or had
ratified his acts. In rejecting the creditors' claims, the court first noted
that the mere fact of marriage is insufficient evidence of spousal
agency.' 35 Nor was the fact that the husband had written two checks (uncashed) on the spouses' mutual ("joint") bank account any evidence of
spousal agency. 136 Although the widow had worked in the stores operated by her husband, she was not in any way active in their financial operation or his other business affairs. 137 It was also beside the point of the
widow's liability that her husband had made a promise to the creditor
that his widow would discharge his debts from his insurance proceeds at
128. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(l) (2000).

129. 11 U.S.C. § 1307(b) (2000).
130. Arturo Rodiguez, 278 B.R. at 757.
131. Womack-Humphreys Architects, Inc. v. Barrasso, 83 S.W.3d 211 (Tex. App.Eastland 2002, no pet.).

132. Id. at 212-13.
133. Id. at 213.
134. Patel v. Kuciemba, 82 S.W.3d 589 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, pet. denied).
135. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.201(c) (Vernon 1998).

136. Patel, 82 S.W.3d at 595.
137. Id. at 596.
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his death. 38 The mere fact that the husband controlled all the familyfinances without his wife's knowledge or interference does way show her
ratification of any liability incurred. 139 Although the court did not make
the point, even full knowledge of the husband's business obligations
would not have obligated his wife for his debts. The facts, however, could
have supported a finding (though there was none) that there was a tacit
understanding between the spouses that the husband had full and independent management of family-business affairs and that he was not acting as her agent. 140 That the widow as the husband's independent
executrix was liable for the debts incurred by the decedent cannot be
questioned 1 4 ' and as independent executrix she did not appeal. 42 But
she did not have personal liability arising from his debts.
C.

NATURE AND EXTENT OF EXEMPT PROPERTY

1. Homestead as Familial and PersonalProtection
The Texas homestead is defined as a protection for families and individuals. 43 The institution does not extend to fictitious legal entities such
as corporations or partnerships. Thus, residential property owned by a
family-partnership but occupied by members of the family cannot qualify
for homestead protection. In In re Monsivais,144 the bankruptcy court
held that partners whose dwelling was located on property belonging to a
family-limited partnership, all of which had passed to the bankruptcy
trustee, were not able to claim that property as homestead realty. 45 In
elementary terms the homestead claimant (there a tenant at will) cannot
assert a homestead claim without the consent of the fee owner, 146 in that
instance the trustee in bankruptcy.
Familial protection, however, does go beyond the nuclear family. Thus,
in Duran v. Henderson147 the debtor, his dependent adult daughter, and
her minor son gave homestead protection to the debtor's home. The fact
that the debtor transferred the exempt property to a family-trust did not,
in the absence of a showing that the transfer was a sham, constitute a
fraudulent transfer1 48 under the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer
138. Id.
139. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.201(c) (Marriage itself does not fix personal liability on
one spouse for the other's non-tortious acts.).
140. Id. § 3.101(b)-(c) (Spouses may agree as to terms of management of community
property without any requirement of a writing.).
141. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 156 (Vernon 2003) (defining liability of community
property for debts of a deceased spouse).
142. Patel, 82 S.W.3d at 593.

143. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50 (as amended in 1997).
144. In re Monsivais, 274 B.R. 263 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2002).

145. Id. at 265.
146. See Sayers v. Pyland, 139 Tex. 57, 161 S.W.2d 769 (1942).
147. Duran v. Henderson, 71 S.W.3d 833, 842 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, pet. denied) (citing In re Hill, 972 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1992)).
148. Id. at 843.
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149

Definition, Designation, and Management of a Homestead

Under Texas law, the homestead right arises as a matter of fact that
does not require recordation. 150 Though the 1997 amendments to the
Texas Constitution 15 1 disposed of prior law that had allowed certain sorts
of homestead claims despite fraudulent assertions to the contrary by the
owner, 152 open and notorious use of premises as a family's only home is
not affected by any prior record of a former location or previous use of
other premises as a homestead. In Estate of Montague v. National Loan
Investors153 the couple had entered into an agreement to borrow money
and consolidate prior loans by giving a deed of trust on realty in Bandera
County, and the agreement gave the couple's address as on that realty.
They declared, however, that their homestead had been since 1982 in Val
Verde County. They also acknowledged an abandonment of the property
in Bandera County as their residence. But they nevertheless continued to
reside there. The husband died in 1988. In 1998 suit was brought on the
unpaid loan and for foreclosure of the deed of trust on the Bandera
County property. The lender sought to estop the borrowers from asserting the Bandera property as their homestead. At the trial the widow testified that she had never given any thought toward moving from the
Bandera County property, and an officer of the lending bank testified
that he had not checked to see that abandonment had occurred. Evidence also showed that the couple had never left the Bandera property
without actually returning to it. As the Texas Supreme Court held in
Laster v. FirstHuntsville Properties Company154 in 1991, if a mortgage on
a homestead is invalid when given, the mortgage is not validated by subsequent abandonment of the property as a homestead. Although the
court did not address the effects of the constitutional amendment of 1997,
it would not have affected the result in this case even if the amendment
had been in effect in 1984 because the couple never abandoned on the
Bandera County property.
In the wake of the great constriction of homestead protection by the
1997 amendments to Article XVI, section 50 of the Texas Constitution,
arguments have been recently advanced for the invalidity of liens on
homesteads, which would not have generated any dispute under prior
(and more liberal) homestead law. In National Loan Investors v. Tay149. TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. §§ 24.002(2), (12), 24.005 (Vernon 1987 & Supp.
2003).
150. See Coates v. Caldwell, 8 S.W. 922 (Tex. 1888).
151. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50 (amended 1997).
152. See, e.g., Hughes v. Wruble, 131 Tex. 444, 116 S.W.2d 368 (1938); Texas Land &
Loan Co. v. Blalock, 76 Tex. 85, 13 S.W. 12 (1892).
153. Estate of Montague v. Nat'l Loan Investors, 70 S.W.3d 242 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 2001, pet. denied).
154. Laster v. First Huntsville Props. Co., 826 S.W.2d 125, 130 (Tex. 1991).
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lor,155

for example, the homeowners denied the validity of a purchase
money lien on their home. The facts showed that the property was indeed a homestead, but the couple could not deny the validity of the lien,
which they had already admitted as valid in a prior bankruptcy proceeding. They were judicially estopped.
In re Jesse Rodriguez 156 was a bankruptcy case in which the debtor
claimed a rural homestead in land subject to a creditor's lien. In 1990 the
debtor and his mother's former husband gave a deed of trust on sixty
acres of rural land. At the time the debtor was apparently living on the
land. Sometime later the debtor's mother and her husband were divorced, and as a term of their divorce settlement the wife received her
husband's interest in the property, but the lender's consent to the transfer
was not obtained. In 2001 his mother conveyed her interest to the debtor.
In his ensuing bankruptcy, the debtor claimed the property as his rural
homestead. Guided by the analysis of the law in In re Perry157 the bankruptcy court concluded that the lender had not met the essential requirements of Property Code section 41.002(c)(2) 158 to show that the whole
property was rural rather than urban, and it was therefore unnecessary
for the court to consider other factors for determining the rural character
of the property' 5 9 under In re Bradley.' 60 The court went on to say that
even though the violation of the due-on-sale clause in the loan agreement
might give rise to recovery on contractual grounds, that clause did not
affect the debtor's assertion of a homestead interest in the land.
In 1908 the Supreme Court of Texas held in Autry v. Reasor' 6l that
with respect to the rural family home of under two hundred acres, the
homestead claim might extend to non-contiguous acreage for a maximum
of two hundred acres if that additional property was used directly by the
claimant to support his family but not merely for the production rental
income. In In re Webb 162 a bankruptcy court applied this rule while acknowledging the controversial holding in In re Mitchell1 63 that a rural
professional might reside in the county and maintain his homestead claim
there even though he is not engaged in farming or ranching or any other
income producing pursuit related directly to the land. 164 In Painewebber,
155. Nat'l Loan Investors v. Taylor, 79 S.W.3d 633 (Tex. App.-Waco 2002, pet.
denied).
156. In re Jesse Rodriguez, 282 B.R. 194 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002).
157. In re Perry, 267 B.R. 759, 766-67 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2001) (noted in Joseph W.
McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, 55 SMU L. REV. 1035, 1053 (2002)).
158. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.002(c) (amended in 1999) (Vernon 2000).
159. Arturo Rodriguez, 282 B.R. at 199-200.
160. In re Bradley, 960 F.2d 502, 507 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub nona. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co. v. Bradley, 507 U.S. 971 (1993).
161. Autry v. Reasor, 102 Tex. 123, 108 S.W. 1162 (1908), rev'd on other grounds, 102
Tex. 123, 113 S.W. 748 (1908). See also Blum v. Rogers, 78 Tex. 530, 15 S.W. 115 (1890).
162. In re Webb, 263 B.R. 788 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2001).
163. In re Mitchell, 132 B.R. 553, 561 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1991). See also In re McCain,
160 B.R. 933 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1993).
164. The court also noted pre-Autry authority that farming on shares with a tenant
constitutes agricultural use to support a homestead claim. Baldeschweiler v. Ship, 50 S.W.
644 (Tex. 1899).
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Inc. v. Murray, 65 however, the federal District Court relied on Mitchell
for its forthright holding that a mobile home located on rural land can
constitute a homestead which may include non-contiguous plots up to a
total of two hundred acres. The land merely supplied a family non-eco16 6
nomic (but only aesthetic or recreational) enjoyment of the area.
Though the court regarded these activities as unlikely to be conducted on
non-contiguous or detached tracts, the court concluded that the entire
area of 147 acres in that instance was exempt as a rural homestead. It was
significant nonetheless that in the past the husband had chopped some
wood on the tract.' 67 The court also sustained the debtor's contention
that his riding lawn mower, tractor, and a 81993 pick-up truck were ex6
empt agricultural vehicles or implements.
3.

Purchasefrom a Debtor-Homestead-Claimant

If a seller has already seemingly abandoned the property as his homestead by moving to a new homestead or simply by moving elsewhere
without acquiring a new homestead, a fact question of homestead abandonment arises even if the homeowner has left some of his possessions
behind. The buyers in Wilcox v. Marriott169 brought suit to remove a
cloud on their title resulting from the filing of an abstract of judgment
against the debtor-husband prior to the sale. The buyers' summary judgment was denied on the ground that there was a question of fact as to
whether the property had been and continued to be the seller's homestead up to the time of the sale. Another pitfall may await the buyer even
if his seller remained in possession after his closing of the sale to the
buyer. It is ordinarily good advice to a purchaser of a home of a judgment debtor to close his purchase prior to the seller's vacating the property so that the seller's homestead interest in the premises wards off
fixing of a judgment lien against the property prior to sale. But there are
pitfalls of which the prospective buyer should be aware. In Dallas Central
Appraisal District v. Wang,' 70 for example, the seller had claimed a tax
exemption that was unwarranted and hence a valid tax lien would have
fixed on the property for delinquent taxes prior to the sale.
A far more complicated situation was presented in The Cadle Company v. Harvey.1 71 In 1981 a debtor purchased a house, and made the
property his home. In 1988 a creditor took a judgment against the debtor
and abstracted his judgment. Though the debtor continued to regard the
property as his homestead, the debtor leased it temporarily to another
165. Painewebber, Inc. v. Murray, 260 B.R. 815 (E.D. Tex. 2001).
166. Id. at 828-30. The court mentioned bird-watching and picnicking, id. at 820, and
taking a walk. Id. at 830.
167. Id. at 830-31.
168. Id. at 831-32.
169. Wilcox v. Marriott, No 04-02-00295-CV, 2003 WL 45025 (Tex. App.-San Antonio,
Jan. 8, 2003, pet. filed).
170. Dallas Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Wang, 82 S.W.3d 697 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2002, pet.
filed).
171. Cadle Co. v. Harvey, 46 S.W.3d 282 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. denied).
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until 1991 and filed an affidavit asserting his homestead claim to the
property. Later in 1991 the debtor-owner leased the property to the man
who had been his grantor with an option to purchase the property, and
the parties entered into an earnest money contract for the sale, but no
earnest money was paid. It was also agreed that rental payments would
be credited toward the purchase price. The lessee took responsibility for
all burdens of ownership from the date of possession as lessee. Though
the leasee-buyer had taken possession of the property in 1991, the conveyance of title to him did not occur until 1996. The holder of the judgment 172 then brought further suit for a summary judgment declaration of
the validity of its lien against the realty and asserted that the property had
ceased to be the debtor's homestead when the second lease was made
and that the creditor's lien had then attached. The buyer-owner crossclaimed for a declaration removing the plaintiff's cloud from his title.
The trial court granted the latter summary judgment. On the creditor's
appeal, the Fort Worth court held that the lessor-buyer had acquired equitable title at the time the lease was given and that the lessor had not at
that time given up his homestead. Thus there was not a non-homestead
period during which the creditor's lien could have attached.
The wife in Cummings v. Gillespie'173 asserted that her conveyance of
her separate property homestead was void because her husband did not
join in the conveyance, 7 4 thus using the joinder rule for her husband's
protection as an offensive weapon. The wife had agreed to sell the property to the buyer and then to lease it from the buyer with an option to
repurchase. The buyer's purchase was financed by a lender of the
purchase money which would pass to the seller at closing. The seller
(without the formal joinder of her husband) joined the buyer in a deed of
trust to the lender. When the loan became delinquent and the lender
sought to foreclose his lien, the seller sought to remove the cloud on her
title. The husband, on being sued for divorce, had already abandoned the
property as his homestead but had previously given a written declaration
to the buyer denying his homestead interest in the property. The seller's
action failed because her husband not only participated actively in the
transaction but gave his quitclaim deed to the property to the purchaser. 175 As the court also pointed out, a sale without joinder of the
spouse of the grantor is not void but may become valid if and when the
non-joining spouse abandons the property as a homestead. The court did
not, however, distinguish between the sale of the homestead and the
mortgage of it in that the seller's husband was not, strictly speaking, a
party to it. Though the mortgage of a homestead without spousal joinder
172. The plaintiff was actually an assignee of the creditor who had transferred all his
interest to the plaintiff.
173. Cummings v. Gillespie, No. 12-01-00046-CV (Tex. App.-Tyler Mar. 20, 2002, pet.
denied) (not designated for publication), 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 452285.
174. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50.
175. Cummings, 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS at *7-9.
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is void and not merely voidable, 176 the court appears to have treated lack
of joinder in the deed of trust as cured by the husband's ratification of the
sale transaction, thus interpreting the sale and mortgage as an integrated
transaction. 177 The court thus treated the husband's involvement in the
transaction as constituting joinder.
D.

ENFORCEMENT OF CLAIMS AGAINST HOMESTEADS

1. Fixing a Trust on a Homestead
Prior to the couple's marriage in Chrissikos v. Chrissikos178 the husband's father had purchased a home for them. The father had directed
the seller to convey the house to the couple and gave his note for the
purchase price. The couple then gave the father an unsecured note for
most of the purchase price, and the wife paid the rest from her separate
property. The couple made some payments on the note to the father, but
payments were in arrears when the wife sued for divorce about three
years later. The father intervened in the divorce proceeding and the
court fixed a resulting trust in his favor upon the couple's homestead. In
sustaining the trial court's conclusion, the Dallas Court of Appeals held
that the father's position as the purchaser of the property (rather than a
mere lender to the couple who themselves purchased the house) 179 enti1 80
tled him to recover.
A somewhat similar dispute was before the San Antonio Court of Appeals in Sahagun v. Ibarra.18 1 There the couple lived together, and
bought a house together though the man had an existing wife. Although
the title to the house was taken in the woman's name, each made a payment of part of the purchase price at the closing of the transaction. After
the couple had separated, the man sought and was awarded a resulting
trust on the property for his share of the payments.' 82
2.

Home-owners' Association's Lien

The dispute in Brooks v. Northglen Ass'n' 83 concerned the extent of
the authority of a homeowner's association to increase maintenance fees
and to foreclose liens against defaulting owners' homesteads. 184 The Tex176. Id. at *8-10.

177. Id.
178. Chrissikos v. Chrissikos, No. 05-00-01548-CV (Tex. App.-Dallas Mar. 6, 2002, no
pet.) (not designated for publication), 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 1658.
179. Id. at *10-11 (citing Lifemark Corp. v. Merritt, 655 S.W. 2d 310, 317 (Tex. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.), and Atkins v. Carson, 467 S.W.2d 495, 500
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
180. With respect to the wife's leaving the residence while the divorce was pending, the
appellate court held that the wife's leaving the home did not constitute her abandonment
of it as her homestead. Id. at *5-6.
181. Sahagun v. Ibarra, 90 S.W.3d 860 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, no pet.).
182. Id. at 863.
183. Brooks v. Northglen Ass'n, 76 S.W.3d 162 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, pet.
granted).
184. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 204.010 (Vernon 2003).
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arkana court concluded in a Harris County case that an association's assessments (within limitations authorized by restrictive covenants on
homeowners' properties) can be enforced by foreclosure. New assessments and other charges imposed only by statutory authority beyond the
terms of applicable restrictive covenants cannot be so enforced unless authorized by a vote of the lot-owners. 85 Justice Grant dissented on the
applicability of particular restrictive covenants in the interpretation of
statutory power of a homeowners' association to accumulate unassessed
tax increases. 186 Prompted by such situations as this one, the Legislature
in 2001 passed further legislation to curtail the power of homeowners'
87
associations to make foreclosures.1
Creditors of a spouse or ex-spouse with an interest in realty in which
the debtor has no homestead interest continue to test their right to reach
the debtor's interest against the other spouse or ex-spouse who asserts a
homestead claim to the property. The appellate decisions produced by
these disputes are thus the progeny of the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Laster v. First Huntsville PropertiesCo.18 8 There, without dividing
the community home, the divorce court had given the wife occupancy of
it until the youngest child reached the age of eighteen. The ex-husband,
who had presumably established a homestead elsewhere, had mortgaged
his interest in the couple's prior home and later defaulted on his mortgage obligation. After the mortgagor's youngest child had reached her
majority, the mortgagor was therefore allowed to reenter the property
and the mortgagee was entitled to foreclose his lien.
In Cure v. Krottinger189 after the husband had filed for bankruptcy and
claimed the community homestead as exempt property, he transferred his
interest in the homestead' to his wife by quit-claim deed. No objection
was raised as to this mode of conveyance to pass the full interest in the
property.190 The trustee asserted that the transfer was voidable under
bankruptcy law as made from the bankruptcy estate, determined as of the
date of bankruptcy and before the exempt property was set apart for the
bankruptcy-debtor. The bankruptcy court nevertheless held that because
exemptions are so determined at that time, the property should therefore
185. Brooks, 76 S.W.3d at 171-76.
186. Id. at 176.
187. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 209.001-.01.1 (Vernon 2003). See Matthew Taylor
Morones & William G. Gammon, Community Owners Associations, Their Dubious Power
to Foreclose, and the Recent Legislation Curtailingthat Power, 66 TEX. BAR J. 218 (2003).
188. Laster v. First Huntsville Prop. Co., 826 S.W. 2d 125 (Tex. 1991), commented on by
Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, 46 SMU L. REV. 1475, 1497-98
(1993). See also Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, 45 Sw. L.J. 1831,
1848-49 (1992).
189. Cure v. Krottinger, No. 7:00-CV-0027-R (not designated for publication), 2001 WL
258619 (N.D. Tex. March 12, 2001).
190. Such a conveyance may be interpreted as meeting all the requirements to transfer
the entire property interest, but to obviate later disputes both spouses should join in the
deed of gift, especially if the community homestead was subject to the spouses' joint management. See Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, 49 SMU L. REV. 1015,
1029-30 (1996) (discussing In re Morrison, 913 S.W. 2d 689 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1995,
no pet.)).
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be considered as exempt and thus capable of transfer by the bankruptdebtor.191
3.

Creditor's Lien on a Homestead

Gant and Hathaway v. Gant' 92 was a dispute of an ex-wife against her
ex-husband and his fiancde in which the ex-husband had sought recourse
to the bankruptcy court after he had failed to discharge a note given to
the ex-wife as part of the division of property in their divorce. The exwife then brought an adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy court which
was settled by entry of an agreed money-judgment against the ex-husband. After the ex-husband had failed to pay the judgment debt, the exwife brought suit in state court to recover the debt, alleging a fraudulent
transfer of funds to the fianc6e. The defendants entered a plea to the
jurisdiction of the court on the ground that only the divorce court had
jurisdiction to resolve the dispute. The Dallas Court of Appeals rejected
the defendant's plea: The ex-wife's suit was not a matter "incident to the
underlying divorce" but merely a suit to enforce a subsequent
judgment. 193
4.

Forfeitureof a Homestead

Seizure and forfeiture of a spouse's community interest (including exempt personalty) has already been judicially affirmed in connection with
wrongdoing of the other spouse. 94 Lot 39, Section C v. State195 presented
the question of forfeiture of a homestead as the situs of a crime albeit
seemingly the homestead of a single adult. The court's discussion was
brief. Whereas the courts in some states have concluded that a homestead is protected from seizure despite the occurrence of criminal offenses there, a number of Texas courts have allowed the seizure of
buildings for drug-related activities and for violation of the law relating to
public nuisance. Other states have allowed the seizure of a homestead
for criminal infractions committed there. 196 Most notably, the Texas
Constitution specifically only protects the homestead from seizure by
creditors. In reliance on the public nuisance case, 197 the Eastland court
concluded that the home as the situs of the offence under the narcotics
191. Cure, 2001 WL 258619, at *6..
192. Gant and Hathaway v. Gant, No. 05-01-00134-CV (Tex. App.-Dallas Feb. 25,
2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication), 2002 WL 257700.
193. Id. at *1. For a discussion of the formalities necessary for the protection of a building contractor hired to construct a new residence on a married couples homestead property, see CVN Group, Inc. v. Delgado, 47 S.W.3d 157 (Tex. App.-Austin 2001, no pet.).
194. See McKnight, supra note 201.
195. Lot 39, Section C v. State, 85 S.W.3d 429 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2002, pet. filed).
196. Id. at 431.
197. 1018 3rd St. v. State, 331 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1959, no writ)
(finding a spurious history of the homestead exemption on which to rely). Id. at 454. For a
full account of that history, see Joseph W. McKnight, Protection of the Family Home from
Seizure by Creditors: The Sources and Evolution of a Legal Principle, 86 S.W. HIsT. Q.
(1983).
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laws was subject to seizure and forfeiture. 198 Relying on sister-state decisions, 199 the Eastland Court of Appeals also pointed out that although a
20 0
homestead is constitutionally protected from the claims of creditors, it
is not protected from sovereign seizure and forfeiture as the situs of a
crime.201 The court nevertheless noted contrary holdings in cases from
some sister-states where the homestead exemption is significantly
broader 20 2 and from Oklahoma where the homestead law is similar to
20 3
that of Texas.
Since the constitutional amendment of 1997204 allowed home-equity
loans against Texas homesteads, several disputes have given the appellate
courts an opportunity to clarify the constitutional provisions and their
accompanying statutory acts. 20 5 In Tarver v. Sebring Capital Credit
Corp.,20 6 the homeowner-mortgagors asserted that the term "points" as
used in the parlance of lenders means "fees" and that the mortgagee had
therefore charged excessive fees over the three-percent (of the loan) limitation of article XVI, section 50(a)(6). The court stated that points are
calculated as a percent of the principal of the loan and that both "statutory and administrative definitions and references to 'interest' either expressly or implicitly include points. '20 7 Thus, it was the court's
conclusion that "points" are interest and not fees.
IV.

DIVISION OF MARITAL PROPERTY ON DIVORCE
A.

PROCEDURAL PRELIMINARIES

1. Prisoner'sRight to Appear
In Taylor v. Taylor 20 8 an appellate court once again sustained a prisoner's right to appear in a suit for divorce or (because his right is a qualified right) to present evidence by other means. 20 9 The Waco Court of
Appeals noted that there may be facts and circumstances that the judge
may consider in denying a bench warrant for a personal appearance. In
this instance the prisoner respondent had also made a timely request for a
198.

TEX. CRIM. PRO. COoE ANN.

§ 59.01 (Vernon 2003).

199. Id. at 431 (citing Romero v. State, 927 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. 1996); Bochas v. State, 951
S.W.2d 64 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, writ denied); State v. One Residence, 907
S.W.2d 644 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1995, no writ); Ex parte Camara, 893 S.W.2d 553
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, pet. denied); 1018-3rd St. v. State, 331 S.W.2d 450 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Amarillo 1959, no writ) (closing a house for one year)).
200. Tex. Const. art. XVI, § 50.
201. Lot 39, Section C, 85 S.W.3d at 431.
202. Id.
203. Id. (citing State ex rel. Means v. Ten Acres of Land, 877 P.2d 597 (Okla. 1994)).
204. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50.
205. See, e.g., Tarver v. Sebring Capital Credit Corp., 69 S.W.3d 708 (Tex. App.-Waco
2002, no pet.).
206. Id.
207. Id. at 712 . Explicit references to points are found in 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE ANN.
§§ 1.102(20), 1.701(b), 1.701(f) (2000).
208. Taylor v. Taylor, 63 S.W.3d 93 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001, no pet.).
209. Id. at 102; see also McKnight, supra note 201, at 1039-40.
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jury trial which was unconstitutionally denied to him. 210 If he were entitled to a jury trial, however, and was denied it, his right to appeal cannot
be denied. The husband-prisoner in In re Seals 21 1 was the petitioner for
divorce. Within a few days of filing his petition he advised the court by
letter that he would be unable to appear in person because of his imprisonment unless the court would request his appearance through the warden of the prison. His wife responded with a general denial and a cross
petition for divorce with an equitable division of property. Almost a year
later the petitioner wrote another letter to the court asking for a request
to the prison authorities that he appear at the trial. About four months
thereafter, the clerk of the court gave the parties notice of the court's
intent to dismiss the case for want of prosecution. 21 2 The dismissal notice
stated that the case would be dismissed "unless an attorney or pro se
party appears in person and shows good cause" to the contrary. 21 3 On
the day set for the dismissal hearing the petitioner filed a further paper
with the court agreeing that the case could be heard without his presence
and the "divorce should be granted in absentia. ' 214 The court nevertheless dismissed the case and the petitioner appealed. The majority of the
Texarkana appellate court concluded that the petitioner's last communication to the court along with his earlier correspondence "should have
been construed as requests for a bench warrant" for his appearance and
an explanation for his failure to appear.21 5 Within thirty days after the
case was dismissed, the wife also filed her agreement that the case could
be taken up without her presence. The appellate court further concluded
that the trial court should not have dismissed the case for want of prosecution. In his dissent Justice Grant pointed out that the husband had not
submitted affidavits to advise the court in determining the issues
presented and he "had never requested a trial setting. '216 The dissenting
judge finally concluded that the trial court had not acted unreasonably in
2
not setting the case for trial in the absence of a motion to do so. 17
Though the husband's later letter as well as the wife's could have been so
construed, both opinions failed to discuss how either party might have
made proof of the ground for divorce as alleged.

210. Taylor, 63 S.W.3d at 99 (citing TEX. CONST. Art. I, § 15).
211. In re Seals, 83 S.W.3d 870 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, no. pet.).
212. TEX. R. Civ. PROC. 165a (Vernon 2003). In Leach v. Attorney General, No. 14-9901330-CV (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 7, 2000, no pet.) (not designated for
publication) 2000 WL 1785125, the court noted that a dismissal for want of prosecution is
void (and thus, not subject to appeal) if the order of dismissal was signed after the trial
court had lost plenary jurisdiction.
213. Seals, 83 S.W.3d at 873.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 874.
216. Id. at 876.
217. Id. at 877 (citing TEX. R. Civ. PRoc. § 245).
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2. Disqualification of Attorney
In In re Taylor2 18 the Waco appellate court dealt with a matter of an
attorney's disqualification on the ground of conflict of interest. Several
years before a member of the attorney's firm had represented the disputing couple and another couple and had provided them advice involving
estate planning and preparation of a stockholders' agreement for a business just created by the two husbands. The terms of the agreement executed by both couples set the net value of the corporation at $200,000,
which might have been an issue in the divorce proceeding. The majority
of the court held that the trial court's failure to grant the wife's motion to
disqualify the attorney or his firm from representing the husband was
error and that her requested writ of mandamus should be granted. 219 Justice Tom Gray dissented to the conclusion that the subject matter of the
stockholders' agreement was "substantially related" to the divorce2 20 and
that the wife had waived her complaint in waiting a month to raise the
issue of which she had been well aware. 221 Justice Gray added that the
conclusion of the court's majority came "dangerously close to a mandamus review of valuation methodology issues," that it was premature for
the appellate court to consider that matter on the record before the
court,22 2 and that the problematical determination of the issue of conflict
of interest might develop as the trial proceeded.2 23
3. Appeal of an Associate Judge's Ruling
In Fountain v. Knebel,22 4 after an associate judge had overruled the
wife's motion to compel discovery concerning the valuation of the husband's interest in his law firm and while an appeal from that ruling was
pending, the trial judge overruled the wife's further motion for a continuance.22 5 In her post-judgment appeal from the latter ruling, the Dallas
Court of Appeals relied on Family Code section 201.015(f),22 6 which provides that the divorce court must hold a hearing on an appeal from the
associate judge's ruling within thirty days, and held that there should
have been a prompt resolution of that appeal.2 2 7 Thus the trial court had
abused its discretion in denying a motion for continuance while the ap22 8
peal from the associate judge's ruling was pending.
218. In re Taylor, 67 S.W.3d 530 (Tex. App.-Waco 2002, no pet.).
219. Id. at 534.

220. Id.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

Id. at 535.
Id. at 535-36.
Id. at 535.
Fountain v. Knebel, 45 S.W.3d 736 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2001, no pet.).
TEx. R. Civ. PROC. 251-52 (motion for continuance).

226. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 201.015(f) (Vernon 2002).

227. Fountain, 45 S.W.3d at 739-40 (citing Harrell v. Harrell, 986 S.W.2d 629 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 1998, no pet.)).
228. Id. at 738.
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Kennedy v. Kennedy22 9 was an extremely contentious divorce proceeding between a doctor and his wife of thirty years. Though the full color of
their dispute cannot be briefly recounted, the proceedings were very
highly charged from the outset. In the course of an early hearing the
evidently "frustrated" associate judge had granted a divorce to the husband in apparent response to (and interpreted by the wife as) a sanction
for the wife's refusal to sign a check as ordered by the associate judge,
who went on to award fees to the husband's attorney based on the wife's
contempt.2 30 All this transpired, however, without any disposition of
property, an inseparable element of any divorce decree. The trial judge
signed the associate judge's order three days later. The associate judge's
ruling was specifically challenged in the wife's appeal from the final judgment.2 31 The Austin Court of Appeals, however, treated this mistake of
the associate judge as harmless error and remarked that the husband's
attorney's handling of the matter was not "extreme and outrageous,"
though he seemed
to have been somewhat carried away by his own rheto2 32
ric at the time.
B.

EFFORTS

To

SETTLE DISPUTES

With a variety of means available to assist couples in settling their disputes concerning division of property and the future welfare of their children, 233 some disputes may nevertheless go on for a very long time
without any resolution in spite of judicial efforts to accelerate the process. 234 Despite the very heavy divorce dockets, the courts must eventually exercise their adjudicative function. In In re Cartwright,235 for
example, the parties, with the advice of their attorneys, had entered into
an agreement incident to divorce 236 in which they designated a mediator
to assist them in resolving continuing disputes. 237 But after seven months
of unsuccessful efforts, no mediation had been achieved, and the court
229. Kennedy v. Kennedy, No. 03-02-00025-CV (Tex. App.-Austin Dec. 5, 2002, pet.
filed) (not designated for publication), 2002 WL 31718226.
230. Id. at *2.

231. Id.
232. Id. at *6.
233. As a means of leverage to encourage settlement of a divorce dispute petitioners
sometimes join a closely held corporation or partnership in which the respondent has an
interest or call the respondent's employer as a witness for verification of the respondent's
wages. Advice to the employer in the latter instance is offered by Kelly McClure and Soja
J. McGill, Don't Drag Me In: An Employer's Dos and Don'ts When Family Court Calls, 63
TEX. B. J. 982 (2000).
234. For comments on the binding effect of a mediated settlement agreement under
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.602 (Vernon 2003); see Nurse v. Nurse, No. 13-01-515-CV, 2002
WL 1289898 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi June 13, 2002, no pet.).
235. In re Cartwright, No. 01-01-00948, 2002 WL 501595 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] Apr. 4, 2002) opinion withdrawn and superseded on rehearing by In re Cartwright,
No. 01-00948-CV (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 3, 2003, no pet. h.) (not designated
for publication), 2003 WL 1746647.
236. Cartwright, 2003 WL 1746647, at *1; see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 7.006(a)
(Vernon 1998).
237. Cartwright,2003 WL 1746647, at *1; see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.602 (Vernon
Supp. 2003).
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appointed another mediator. After further lack of success in reaching a
settlement, the court changed the role of the latter mediator to that of an
arbitrator. 238 Both parties appealed from that exercise of judicial authority. The Houston First District Court of Appeals concluded that the trial
court's appointment of the mediator to act as arbitrator without the consent of the parties was improper. 239 The mediator had already received
candid disclosures and confidences from both parties, and with that confidential information he was therefore not in a position to act as arbitrator
in the same or a related matter. 240 The function of the arbitrator is quasijudicial, and without the consent of the parties after receipt of confidences of the parties
he may not be able to exercise his arbitrative func24 1
tion properly.
In Welkener v. Welkener 242 the parties had reached a property settlement prior to the divorce hearing. The parties had agreed that the wife
would receive a specific amount of the husband's retirement pay each
month and that term was included in the judgment. On appeal the wife
asserted that this term of the judgment did not reflect her understanding,
which was that she was entitled to a percentage amount of retirement
benefits-which was the way that the agreed amount was computed. The
Corpus Christi appellate court pointed out that the wife had not raised
her issue of mistake until after the rendition of judgment and, thus, it
could not be considered. The wife's unilateral mistake in which she
sought to withdraw her consent therefore came too late in her motion for
243
a new trial.

In Stine v. Stewart244 a property settlement agreement had been
reached that included an agreement by the husband to repay a loan made
by the wife's mother toward the purchase of a home, of which the wife
was given occupancy until it was sold. After several years, the ex-husband sold the house but failed to pay the debt. In reviewing the Fort
Worth Court of Appeals' decision in favor of the ex-husband, the Texas
Supreme Court in a per curiam opinion held that the former mother-inlaw was a third party creditor-beneficiary of the agreement though she
was not a party to it.245 The court carefully distinguished Brown v. Ful238.

Cartwright, 2003 WL 1746647, at *3; see TEx. FAM. CODE ANN.

1998).
239. Cartwright, 2003 WL 1746647, at *5.
240. Id.
241. Id.

§ 6.601(Vernon

242. Welkener v. Welkener, 71 S.W.3d 364 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.).
243. Id. at 367. The court, however, reversed that part of the decree that confirmed the
husband's title to particular land as his separate property. Presumably this award was not
part of the settlement agreement. The appellate court found no evidence in the record to
support separate ownership in the husband as was concluded at the hearing on the motion
for a new trial. Id. at 368.
244. Stine v. Stewart, 80 S.W.3d 586 (Tex. 2002). For an account of the facts as
presented by the Fort Worth court in Stewart v. Stine, 57 S.W.3d 94 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 2001), see Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, 55 SMU L. REV.
1035, 1064 (2002).
245. Stine, 80 S.W.3d at 590.
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lenwider 246 as a case in which the parties to a settlement agreement
merely "allocated responsibility" 247 for payment but had not "specifically
required" the ex-husband to pay the creditor. 24 8 The debt described2 in
49
the agreement not only met all statutory requirements for enforcement
but was also not affected by the limitation provisions of the Texas Family
Code with respect to "[a] suit to enforce the division of future property
not in existence at the time of the original decree. 2 50 This was simply a
breach of an agreement to which the four year statute of limitation was
252
applicable 25 1 and had been met.

Despite its standing as the most capable bar anywhere in handling the
intricacies of divorce, that part of the State Bar of Texas devoting its attention to familial disputes must sometimes have recourse to the advice
of estate planners, accountants, and financial advisers to implement the
253
attorney's advice. Such professionals are well known to Texas lawyers.
In some other jurisdictions less sophisticated than ours, resort is sometimes made to specially trained divorce planners certified through the National Association of State Boards of Accountancy.2 54 Some Texas
accountants have also received this training and many have already developed talents to reach this sort of level. In many instances Texas family
lawyers merely seek the assistance of tax counsel to advise them on the
drafting of provisions for ex-spousal maintenance 255 and division of investment-properties along lines with which counsel are already generally
256
familiar.
An agreed judgment was the center of dispute in Appleton v. Appleton.257 With the advice of counsel the divorcing spouses had reached an

agreement concerning disposition of stock options acquired by the husband from his employer as community property. 258 In the course of the
246. Brown v. Fullenwider, 52 S.W.3d 169 (Tex. 2001).
247. Id. at 170.
248. Stine, 80 S.W.3d at 591.
249. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16065 (Vernon 1997).
250. Stine, 80 S.W.3d at 592 (citing TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 9.003(b)

(Vernon 1998)).
251. Id. (citing TEx. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.051 (Vernon 1997)).

252. Id. at 592.
253. There are numerous Texas family lawyers who can also offer such advice. See, for
example, the comments of a number of them on valuation matters in The Nature of the
Beast from Horses to Hedge Funds, Tips on Valuing Businesses, 25 FAM. ADVOC. 20, 24
(royalty interests), 34 (oil and gas interests), 35 (early-stage companies).
254. For the internet website of the National Association Board of Accounting and its
Institutes of Certified Divorce Planners, see http://www.institutecdp.com.
255. See Cindy L. Wofford, When Alimony Isn't Alimony: How to Avoid Disallowance
of the Alimony Deduction, 4 TAX PRAC. & PROC. § 25 (Oct.-Nov. 2002).
256. See coursebooks for the Annual Marriage Dissolution Course and the Advanced
Family Law Course of the Family Law Section of the State Bar of Texas, which regularly
include presentations on these subjects.
257. Appleton v. Appleton, 76 S.W.3d 78 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no
pet.).
258. Applying the law of contracts to the terms of the agreed decree, the appellate
court found no ambiguity in the decree and no issue of fact to preclude a summary judgment in favor of the ex-husband. Id. at 86 (citing McGoodwin v. McGoodwin, 671 S.W.2d
880, 882 (Tex. 1984)).
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trial, the court had awarded sanctions against the ex-wife for making a
groundless claim. But the appellate court found that the ex-wife, whose
failure to produce a record of the hearing had resulted in the sanctions
259
order, had waived any finding of error on the part of the trial court.
C.

GROUNDS FOR INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL

Failure of the trial judge to sign an order within ten days was the
ground for reversal in an interlocutory appeal taken in In re Gary.260 The
wife had sought to proceed in forma pauperis, and the state's objection
made by the court clerk was sustained. The failure of the trial judge to
comply with the Code of Appellate Procedure2 61 caused automatic reversal of the court's disposition of the state's special motion. In a concurring
opinion, Justice Quinn made it very clear that in his view it is unnecessary
to appeal specially with respect to indigence and that a single notice of
2 62
appeal to put the entire case before the appellate court is sufficient.
The concurring judge was therefore of the opinion that the authorities
relied on by the court were erroneous and therefore should not be
2 63
followed.
In Bilyeu v. Bilyeu 264 the trial court had issued a protective order in a
matter of family violence. The Austin Court of Appeals held that such an
order is not subject to an interlocutory appeal.
D.

RECEIVERSHIP

The unavailability of an interlocutory challenge beyond the issue of the
receiver's appointment usually forecloses further concern by the parties
with the court's resort to receivership. 26 5 In Waite v. Waite,266 despite the
fact that funds subject to the receivership were deposited in the registry
of the court, the court's order dissolving a receivership was not subject to
an interlocutory appeal, which may be taken only with respect to an order
appointing a receiver.2 67
259. Id.

260. In re Gary, No. 07-01-0466-CV (Tex. App.-Amarillo, Aug 7, 2002, no pet.) (not
designated for publication), 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 5749.
261. TEX. R. App. PROC. §§ 34.5-.6 (Vernon 2003).
262. Gary, 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 5749, at *12.
263. Id.
264. Bilyeu v. Bilyeu, 86 S.W.3d 278 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, no pet.).
265. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.502(a)(5) (Vernon Supp. 2003); see also TEX. CIv.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 64.002(c)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2003).

266. Waite v. Waite, 76 S.W.3d 222, 223 (Tex. App-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.).
267. "The disposition of the receivership funds also may not be challenged by interlocutory appeal." Id. at 223 (citing Bally Total Fitness Corp. v. Jackson, 53 S.W.3d 352, 355
(Tex. App. 2001)); TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. COE ANN. § 51.014(b) (Vernon Supp. 2003);
see also Walston v. Lockhart, No. 10-00-362-CV (Tex. App.-Waco Jan. 2, 2002, no pet.)
(not designated for publication), 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 17. In a post-divorce partition
proceeding in which a receiver has been appointed to divide property, if the receiver's sale
is set aside, the receivership terminates and the court no longer has custody of the property. Id. at *6-7.
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In In re Edwards268 the Texarkana Court of Appeals took pains to
stress compliance with details of the statutory provisions concerning a receivership. The appellate court concluded, as the wife asserted, that the
trial court had abused its discretion in appointing a receiver when the
work of the receiver had been completed and approved. 269 A party can
protect her interest in such a situation "by requesting a stay of the order
T The court
appointing a receiver pending review on appeal. 2 70
went on to
say, however, that the particular trial court's customary practice of appointing a receiver when the parties cannot agree on the division of community property is improper unless the divorce court is careful to follow
the rule in Hailey v. Hailey271 that there must be a prior determination
that particular property is not capable of partition in kind. 2 72 Thus, the

appointment of a receiver may be supplemental to the divorce court's
273
power to make an equitable division of the community estate.

E.

ADJUDICATING AND ENFORCING DIVISION
OF PROPERTY INTERESTS

1.

Making the Division of Property

In the early 1960s, one of the principal complaints toward the law at
that time was that there was a discriminatory definition of adultery as a
ground for divorce: a single act of adultery constituted adultery for a wife
whereas a course of adultery was required for such a charge against a
husband. 274 From time to time, the argument has since been made (and
some courts have so concluded) that in order to show fault as a basis for
division of property on divorce, adultery or some other fault must be pled
as a ground for divorce.275 Although this pleading practice is sometimes
followed as a means of avoiding argument on the point, one of the principal reasons for adopting the insupportability ground for divorce was to
preclude the acrimony which fault-pleading may cause. 27 6 In Phillips v.
Phillipsthe opinion of the Beaumont Court of Appeals seems to rely on a
268. In re Edwards, 79 S.W.3d 88 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, no pet.).
269. Id. at 97.
270. Id.
271. Hailey v. Hailey, 160 Tex. 372, 376-77, 331 S.W.2d 299, 303 (1960).
272. Id. at 96.
273. Johnston v. Crook, 93 S.W.3d 263 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.),
was another milestone in the long and tortuous struggle of which Ex parte Swate was a
prior part. Ex pane Swate, 922 S.W.2d 122 (Tex. 1996). The post-divorce receiver's claim
was remanded for further proceedings concerning alleged fraudulent transfers and the alleged effects of time running against attacks upon them.
274. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 4639(3) (Vernon 1965).
275. See Mootz v. Mootz, 615 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, no writ) (emphasis added). A decade ago a number of trial courts in Harris County took this view. For
a recent case in which the court mentioned adultery of the husband as an element in determining a "just and fair" division of the community estate and without any comment as to
pleading, see Eliz v. Eliz, No. 05-01-00085-CV (Tex. App.-Dallas Aug. 19, 2002, no pet.)
(not designated for publication), 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 5951 at *7.
276. See Joseph W. McKnight, Commentary on the Texas Family Code, Title 1, 21 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 911, 985 (1990).
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student's comment for its legal history and disregards other sources. 277
The real difficulty in appraising this decision, however, is in determining
the nature of disagreement within the court. In this instance, a fault
ground for divorce was not pled and the division of property in monetary
terms certainly favored the wife, though the nature of the husband's fault,
which was evidently considered in making the division, was not described.
Two judges voted to affirm the decision of the court below. The opinion
of the chief justice in favor of this conclusion states that if a fault ground
for divorce is neither pled nor proved, the trial court can still rely on fault
grounds in making a just and right division. 278 This view conforms to
standard Texas practice. The concurring judge made it very clear that in
dividing the community estate a divorce court may consider "conduct
causing the divorce" and not merely the ground on which the divorce was
granted.2 79 Both of these judges also concluded that the divorce court
did not abuse its discretion in making an unequal division of the community property. The dissenting judge began by saying that his colleagues
'28 0
had found that "the trial court erred on considering fault and I agree.
But he disagreed that "the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the
division of the community estate. '281 As to abuse of discretion by the
trial court, the dissenting judge's reference to fault was in the sense of
fault as grounds for divorce. It appears that all members of the court
would have been more comfortable in support of an unequal division of
community property if there had been pleading and proof of fault as a
ground for divorce though it is not clear (as stated by the dissenting
judge) that his colleagues had found any error (however harmless) in considering fault though unpled as a ground for divorce.
In Martel v. Marte2 82 the wife's adultery was not asserted as a ground
for divorce but was only a matter to be considered in the division of property. The husband nevertheless complained that the trial court erred in
failing to make a finding as to the wife's adultery (which she admitted as
occurring after their separation) so that he might use the finding in his
proceeding to secure a canonical divorce, thus allowing a subsequent canonical marriage. The Dallas Court of Appeals forthrightly stated that
277. Phillips v. Phillips, 75 S.W. 3d 564, 570 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2002, no pet.) (citing Comment, Marriage and Divorce under the Texas Family Code, 8 Hous. L. REV. 100

(1970)). In determining the temper of the times and the intentions of the draftsman whose
work was enacted in the 1969 legislative session, the court might also have cited Joseph W.

McKnight, Commentary on the Texas Family Code, Title 1, 5 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 281, 320
(1974); Joseph W. McKnight, Commentary on the Texas Family Code, Title 1, 13 TEX. TECH.
L. REV. 611, 676-77 (1982). The court also failed to mention of the doctrine of comparative
rectitude but pointed out that "[a]dultery was an absolute bar to a divorce where the action
was brought on one of the [other] fault grounds." Phillips, 75 S.W.3d at 570; see also
McFadden v. McFadden, 213 S.W.2d 71, 74 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1948, mandamus
overruled); Marr v. Marr, 191 S.W.2d 512, 513 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1945).
278. Phillips, 75 S.W.3d at 573.
279. Id. at 575-76.
280. Id at 576.
281. Id.
282. Martel v. Martel, No. 05-99-00177-CV (Tex. App.-Dallas Aug. 31, 2001, no pet.)
(not designated for publication), 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 6025.
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the "[w]ife cannot be faulted for the breakup of the marriage on this
ground where the adultery did not occur until after the separation. '2 83
Exercising their good judgment in making a division of community
property with or without pleading of fault, trial courts often assess the
wrongful conduct on the part of one of the spouses as an element in guiding its judgment. 28 4 Calling such consideration a "sanction," however, is
apt to be very misleading. 28 5 In the event of wrongful behavior on the
part of both spouses the court can rely on the doctrine of comparative
286
rectitude.
In O'Neal v. O'Nea2 8 7 the wife, who had neither answered nor appeared at the trial, appealed to the Eastland Court of Appeals on the
ground of the respondent-husband's failure to discharge his burden of
proof in support of the division of property and argued that the award to
her, was an inadequate amount for the support of their child who was
living with her in Australia at the time of the hearing. The appellate court
concluded (from the husband's language in the record) that the husband,
as the only witness at the trial, merely affirmed the contents of the proposed decree which the judge apparently had before him. On the basis of
that conclusion, the appellate court held that such "testimony" standing
alone would not support the court's making a just and fair division of
property and its award of child support. The case was remanded to the
288
trial court for further proceedings.
In Winger v. Winger2 89 the divorce decree of 1999 incorporated the husband's proposed property division, which included among the items of
community property to be awarded to the wife certain realty that the wife
had conveyed to her son three years before. That transfer had been made
so that she and her son might procure an improvement loan on the property, but the son promised to reconvey the property to his mother. Third
persons had transferred the property during the marriage and the deed
recited reception of one dollar and "other good and valuable consideration." Though the record included testimony of one of the grantors that
the transfer had been intended as a gift, there was other evidence indicating its acquisition for valuable services rendered to the grantors by the
wife. Elsewhere in the husband's incorporated document the property
was identified as the wife's separate property. The division of the property as part of the community estate by the divorce court was not dis283. Id. at *7 (citing Winkle v. Winkle, 951 S.W.2d 80, 91 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1997, writ denied)).
284. See Schlueter v. Schlueter, 975 S.W.2d 584 (Tex. 1998); Vickery v. Vickery, 999
S.W.2d 342 (Tex. 1998). For a comment on the latter case by one of the wife's counsel, see
Christa Brown, Marital Fraud: The Tort Survives with an Appellate Twist, 63 TEX. B.J. 630
(2000).
285. See Phillips, 75 S.W.3d at 567.
286. See Martel, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 6025.
287. O'Neal v. O'Neal, 69 S.W.3d 347 (Tex. App-Eastland 2002, no pet.)
288. Id. at 350.
289. Winger v. Winger, No. 09-01-188-CV (Tex. App.-Beaumont July 11, 2002, no
pet.) (not designated for publication), Tex. App. LEXIS 4909.
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turbed by the Beaumont appellate court in exercising all reasonable
presumptions in favor of the divorce court as the finder of fact and in the
exercise of its good judgment in making the division. 290 If precise findings of fact and conclusions of law had been made by the trial court, however, a different conclusion might have been reached.
In Courtney v. Courtney29 1 a disappointed husband complained that
the divorce court had merely made a division of accounts in dollars rather
politely rejected his complaint as
than percentages. The appellate court
2 92
without any supporting precedent.
In Miner v. Miner293 the ex-wife brought suit to enforce a decree directing the ex-husband to distribute certain net profits from a software
program when it was sold. The ex-husband responded that the asset was
not sold but only a change in form had been achieved by the ex-husband's
subsequent expenditures of his personal talents to the successive versions
of the software program. The trial court had purported to clarify how net
profits were to be computed. The ex-husband relied heavily on Rodrigue
v. Rodrigue294 where the federal Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had dealt
with the preemptive effect of federal copyright law in connection with an
ex-wife's lack of ownership right to the husband's artistic creations. The
of the
Corpus Christi appellate court held that the trial court's alteration
295
original decree was a clarification rather than a modification.
296
The divorce decree of December 6, 2000, dealt with in Karp v. Karp
provided that the former spouses would continue to own their home as
cotenants. Sometime more than thirty days thereafter the parties entered
into an agreement under Rule 11297 in which they agreed that the ex-wife
would continue to occupy the house, that its value would be appraised,
and that the ex-wife would have until May 1, 2000 to exercise a right to
purchase the ex-husband's interest in the property. If she should decide
to purchase his interest, the purchase price would be divided equally between them after deducting the ex-husband's equal share of expenses
paid by the ex-wife. The court then approved the agreement. An appraisal was made pursuant to the decree and the ex-wife exercised her
option to buy the ex-husband's interest in the house. The ex-husband
refused to comply with the agreement because he regarded the appraisal
value as too low. The ex-wife then sued to enforce the agreement and the
290. Id.
291. Courtney v. Courtney, No. 14-02-01103-CV (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication), Tex. App. LEXIS 5530.
292. Id. at *5.
293. Miner v. Miner, No. 13-01-659-CV (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi Aug. 8, 2002, no
pet.) (not designated for publication), 20002 Tex. App. LEXIS 5841.
294. Rodrigue v. Rodrigue, 218 F.3d 432, 442-43 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S.
905 (2001). See Alsenz v. Alsenz, 101 S.W.3d 648 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no
pet. h.).
295. Miner, at *7.
296. Karp v. Karp, No. 14-01-00902-CV (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 7, 2002,
no pet.) (not designated for publication), Tex. App. LEXIS 8014.
297. TEX. R. Civ. P. 11.
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ex-husband contested the court's jurisdiction to enforce the agreement
because it amounted to a modification of the decree. The Houston Fourteenth District Court of Appeals sustained the trial court's enforcement
of the agreement as a contract independent of the decree under Ex parte
Gorena.298 The court went on to say that the agreement approved by the
court had become a part of the judgment subject to the court's power to
enforce its own order. Though the court cited Allen v. Allen2 99 in support
of this conclusion, the court's reasoning seems to misconstrue those two
decisions of the Texas Supreme Court.
2.

Error in Characterization

It is clearly error on the part of a divorce court to award separate property of one spouse to the other. 3°° In the evident interest of saving time
and expense of further proceedings, it has been concluded that if the trial
court's mischaracterizes separate property as community property, the
matter should not be remanded for a new division if the error produced is
de minimis. 30 1 But what constitutes that amount in any particular case
appears to rest on the appellate court's good judgment. Simmons v.
Dobbs30 2 provides an example. The ex-wife appealed the divorce court's
division of the community property and the matter was remanded by the
appellate court to the trial court. During the pendency of the appeal the
ex-husband had bought a travel-trailer for just over $36,000. On remand
the trial court recognized that trailer as the ex-husband's separate property and went on to award it to him as his share of the community estate,
which the trial court had divided in favor of the ex-wife by fifty-five to
forty-five percent. The ex-husband appealed that decision. The Dallas
court found that inclusion of the value of the trailer in the community
estate caused an error of over five percent of the court's predetermined
ratio for division which the appellate court held was more that a mere de
minimis error.30 3 In reaching this conclusion, the court used the purchase
price of the trailer in its computation though no mention was made of a
purchase money lien upon it for an unstated amount 30 4 that the ex-husband was committed to pay.
298. Ex Parte Gorena, 595 S.W.2d 921, 923 (Tex. 1979).
299. Allen v. Allen, 717 S.W.2d 311, 313 (Tex. 1986).
300. Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Tex. 1977) (realty); Cameron v.
Cameron, 641 S.W.2d 210, 213-19 (Tex. 1982) (personalty); Eliz v. Eliz, No. 05-01-00085CV (Tex. Aug. 19, 2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication), 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS,
at *708 (holding that future earnings are husband's separate property and should not be
used in valuing his medical practice at divorce.).
301. Jacobs v. Jacobs, 687 S.W.2d 731, 733 (Tex. 1985); see Hunt v. Hunt, 952 S.W.2d
564, 568 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1997, no writ); McElwee v. McElwee, 911 S.W.2d 182, 189
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied).
302. Simmons v. Dobbs, No. 05-02-00122-CV (Tex. App.-Dallas Oct. 31, 2002, no pet.)
(not designated for publication), 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 7808.
303. Id. at *4 (citing McElwee, 911 S.W.2d at 190 (resting on Jacob v. Jacob, 687 S.W.2d
731 (Tex. 1985))).
304. Simmons, 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS, at *7.
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Ex-SPOUSAL MAINTENANCE

Ex-spousal maintenance is not to be used as a substitute for division of
community property when property can be divided. In O'Carolan v.
Hopper 0 5 the Austin Court of Appeals concluded that the evidence did
not support an unequal division of the community estate in favor of the
husband. On the contrary, the husband's greater earning capacity and
better health and the wife's lack of a separate estate supported disproportionate division in favor of the wife. 30 6 Nor was divestiture of the wife's
community interest in the family home warranted as a means of providing
a home for the almost adult child whose custody was awarded to the hus30 8
band. 30 7 The legislative purpose in providing ex-spousal maintenance
was not that it should be used as a device "as if it were property ... [but
rather] to provide temporary and rehabilative support for a spouse whose
ability for self-support is lacking or has deteriorated over time while engaged in homemaking activities and whose capital assets are insufficient
to provide support. '30 9 The appellate court did not allude to the wife's
remarriage while the case was on appeal, a fact regarded as an inappro3 10
priate consideration.
In Amos v. Amos 3 11 the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals did not mention community property and presumably what little there might have
been was amicably divided by the parties, who also agreed on conservatorship and support of the minor children to extend for more than a decade. The only question before the court was the proper extent of the
award of ex-spousal maintenance: for a period of three years and for a
monthly amount of the lesser of twenty percent of the husband's average
gross monthly income or $2,500.312 The appellate court concluded that in
light of the wife's serous physical disability, her limited earning power,
and the very modest extent of her financial resources, the trial court had
acted reasonably in providing the maximum of ex-spousal maintenance to
'3 13
meet the wife's "reasonable minimum needs.
3
14
In Carlin v. Carlin the divorce court ordered the husband to pay his
incapacitated wife a specific amount monthly for three years unless she
was able to resume her self-support prior to that time. Just after the end
of the three years' term during which the ex-husband had fulfilled his
305. O'Carolan v. Hopper, 71 S.W.3d 529 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, no pet.).
306. Id. at 533.

307. Id.
308. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 8.055-.057 (Vernon 2003).
309. O'Carolan, 71 S.W.3d at 533.
310. The extent to which the (professionally generally unwanted) alimony standard of
common law states may eventually creep into the Texas practice in fixing ex-spousal maintenance remains to be seen. See, e.g., Robert Kirkman Collins, The Theory of Marital
Residuals: Applying an Income Adjustment Calculus to the Enigma of Alimony, 24 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 23 (2001).

311.
312.
313.
314.

Amos v. Amos, 79 S.W.3d 747 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.).
Id. at 751 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 8.055 (Vernon Supp. 2002)).
Id. (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 8.054 (Vernon Supp. 2002)).
Carlin v. Carlin, 92 S.W.3d 902 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2002, no pet.).

2003]

HUSBAND AND WIFE

1699

obligation, the ex-wife moved for continuation of the prior order and alleged that, on account of her continuing incapacity with rheumatoid arthritis, the ex-husband should continue the support payments. The
Beaumont Court of Appeals held that the divorce decree anticipated judicial review after three years. After its own long review of the evidence,
the court differed with the trial court's order to extend the ex-husband's
duty of support because the ex-wife had not shown that she was unable to
work full-time as a result of devoting herself to the care of her mother.
The order was therefore remanded to the court below. 315 The appellate
court nevertheless suggested that continuation of the order would not be
a "modification" of the original order which by the court's interpretation
of its terms seemed to have been anticipated by the parties' agreed order
3 16
in the divorce proceeding.
In the general context of divorce decrees applicable to awards of future
ex-spousal maintenance as well as other situations, the court said in
Zorilla v. Wahid 317 that when the terms of a divorce decree are expressly
applicable to the discharge of all "further liabilities ... imposed by the
temporary orders," arrears of temporary support are not thereby discharged as "further liabilities. '3 18 Still more specificity might have been
desired in the trial court's final order.
G.

APPEAL

Although the voluntary acceptance of benefits of the trial court's judgment is a bar to an appeal by the benefited party, 319 a right of appeal is
allowed when the appellant has not voluntarily accepted benefits of the
decree. 320 There is a further narrow exception to this rule barring the
right of appeal. The Supreme Court of Texas pointed out in Texas State
Bank v. Amaro32 1 that if the appellee concedes or is found to concede
that which the appellant accepts, an appeal is not barred. Although this
was not fundamentally a divorce case or even a marital dispute, the principle would be applicable in a divorce context as it was in this instance
related to a divorce. In Amaro the trial court had created a trust of the
tortious damages recovered by an incapacitated husband. The court
maintained continuing jurisdiction over the trust. Another district court
had subsequently determined that the ex-husband-beneficiary was competent in an uncontested divorce case. 322 But in that situation the trust
was still subsisting until the court that created it decreed its termina315. Id. at 911.
316. Id. at 904-05.
317. Zorilla v. Wahid, 83 S.W.3d 247 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002, no pet.).
318. Id. at 256 (citing Ex parte Shaver, 597 S.W.2d 498, 500 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1980, orig. proceeding)).
319. Carle v. Carle, 149 Tex. 469, 472-79, 23 S.W.2d 1002, 1004 (1950).
320. For other exceptions, see Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, 52
SMU L. REV. 1143, 1181 (1999).
321. Tex. State Bank v. Amaro, 87 S.W.3d 538, 544 (Tex. 2002) (opinion reported at 74
S.W.3d 392 withdrawn).
322. Id. at 540.
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Both former spouses agreed that the capacity of the ex-husband
had been regained by the finding of the divorce court and as a result the
trust terminated. The ex-husband, however, contested the jurisdiction of
the court creating the trust to approve the trustee's final account and thus
to rule on the trustee's potential liability for breach of trust. To that end
he had brought another action against the trustee in yet another court.
The trial court that had created the trust nevertheless proceeded to terminate the trust and to approve the trustee's final accounting. The ex-husband appealed, and the court of appeals reversed the conclusion of the
trial court. 324 The trustee sought review by the Texas Supreme Court.
The court concluded that the first trial court had properly retained jurisdiction over the trust in accordance with its right to terminate the trust as
provided by that court in creating the trust. Although the supreme court
sustained the trial court's approval of the trustee's final account, the supreme court held that such approval did not constitute an exoneration of
the trustee for breach of trust with respect to impropriety of investments
and other breaches of fiduciary duty complained by the ex-husband. The
trustee had argued that the ex-husband's acceptance of trust funds had
not amounted to enjoyment of benefits of the judgment so that an appeal
would be barred.325 Thus, the court concluded that mere acceptance of
the such trust funds was an exception to the rule against voluntary accept326
ance of benefits as a bar to appeal.
The legislative requirement of 1999 that a divorce court shall provide
findings of fact and conclusions of law on request of a party was amplified
in 2001.327 These provisions have already eased the appellate process for
family law cases, particularly those involving divorces.
tion.323

H.

EFFECT OF BANKRUPTCY

A suit for divorce is sometimes responded to with a suit for bankruptcy
in order to snarl the proceeding at the start. Others file for bankruptcy
immediately after judgment in the hope that the magic of the Bankruptcy
Code will wipe away duties of support. The latter objective is, of course,
a delusion. 328 In any case, it is good practice for the successful divorcelitigant with the right to receive realty to give immediate constructive notice of the divorce decree by recordation. Thus, if the other party later
files for bankruptcy and the bankruptcy trustee asserts a right to the real
property interest held by the successful divorce-litigant, the prior filing
would not violate the automatic-stay provision of the Bankruptcy
323. Under section 142.005(d), (e) of the Texas Property Code, a statutory accounting
of the trustee constitutes the basis for winding up the trust and distributing what is due to
the beneficiary under the trust. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 142.005(d), (e) (Vernon 2003).
324. Amaro v. Tex. State Bank, 28 S.W.3d 789, 796 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002,
pet.).
325. Amaro, 87 S.W.3d at 544.
326. Id.
327. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.711 (Vernon 2003).
328. 11 U.S.C. § 522 (a)(5) (2000).
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In In re Thornburg330 the dispute involved an already snarled situation
after entry of the divorce decree in 1995. The parties had entered into a
property settlement agreement and this settlement was incorporated in
the divorce decree. In 1997 the ex-husband-debtor filed a petition in
bankruptcy in which he listed his former wife as a creditor. After confirmation of the debtor's Chapter 13 plan, for the narrow object of allowing
the ex-wife a hearing in state court, the automatic stay was lifted by
agreement with respect to particular realty. Later in 1997 the ex-wife
filed an abstract of a judgment secured in a post-divorce enforcement
proceeding in order to fix a lien on that real property. The ex-husband
responded with a motion to the bankruptcy court to hold his ex-wife in
contempt for violating the automatic-stay provision of the Bankruptcy
Code. 33 1 The bankruptcy court concluded that the subsequent abstraction of judgment constituted a violation of the automatic stay and that the
ex-wife's prior lis pendens filing constituted a violation 332 in that it went
further than the narrow cause for which the stay had been lifted. 333 The

court added that this filing affected property of the bankruptcy estate "re334
gardless of the exempt or non-exempt status of the property involved.
Because the ex-wife's voidable acts had been declared void, however, she
could not until then be held in contempt of the bankruptcy court. 335
Once the court had acted, the ex-wife was in contempt though the court
awarded no sanctions against her in Thornburg in light of "the blatant
' 336 The court
disregard of both of these parties for the ... court system.

orders of the state court were
was nevertheless careful to observe that the 337
not intended to be attacked or invalidated.
In the far less rancourous setting of In re Nelson338 it was pointed out
329. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2000). In a non-bankruptcy case, Burrows v. Quintanilla, No. 1301-134-CV (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi, July 25, 2002, pet. denied) (not designated for publication), 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 5544, the divorce court had awarded the homestead to the
wife but the ex-husband did not obey the court's order to transfer the property to her but
transferred it to his father who had allegedly bought the land initially. The Internal Revenue Service then foreclosed its lien against the father on the property. The property was
sold but the wife successfully sued the purchaser to remove the cloud from her title.
330. In re Thornburg, 277 B.R. 719 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2002).
331. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2000).
332. In re Thornburg, 277 B.R. at 730.
333. Id. In FDIC v. Walker, 815 F. Supp. 987, 990 (N.D. Tex. 1993), the court said that
a Texas lis pendens filing in relation to a bankruptcy proceeding is the "functional
equivalent to an involuntary lien," though the federal Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals over
thirty years before the filing of that lis pendens notice had said that it "is simply a notice of
pending litigation." See Allstate Fin. Co. v. Zimmerman, 272 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1959).
Although the lis pendens filing does not fix a lien on property in issue in litigation, it is (as
the bankruptcy court said) "constraining" on the debtor and makes it very difficult to negotiate a sale or mortgage on the property in issue. In re Thornburg, 277 B.R. at 729.
334. In re Thornburg, 277 B.R. at 729.
335. Id. at 731.

336. Id.
337. Id.
338. In re Nelson, 274 B.R. 789 (8th Cir. B.A.P. 2002) (relying on Boggs v. Boggs, 520
U.S. 833 (1997); Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992); In re Anderson, 269 B.R. 27
(8th Cir. B.A.P. 2001)).
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by the federal Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appeals Court that a California
debtor's interest in his former wife's ERISA-qualified retirement plan
was not property of the debtor's bankruptcy estate. An interest in the
plan had nevertheless been awarded to the debtor by a qualified domestic
relations order of the California divorce court. One wonders whether an
"if and when" order of a Texas divorce court 339 affecting the other
spouse's retirement benefits would be similarly construed.
Gant and Hathaway v. Gant340 involved a dispute between an ex-wife
and her ex-husband and his fianc6e, in which the ex-husband had sought
recourse to the bankruptcy court after he had failed to discharge a note
given to the ex-wife as part of the division of property in their divorce.
The ex-wife then brought an adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy
court, which was settled by entry of an agreed money-judgment against
the ex-husband. After the ex-husband had failed to pay the judgment
debt, the ex-wife brought suit in a different state court to recover the
debt, alleging a fraudulent transfer of funds to the fianc6e. The defendants entered a plea to the jurisdiction of the court on the ground that only
the divorce court had jurisdiction to resolve the dispute. The Dallas
Court of Appeals rejected the defendant's plea: The ex-wife's suit was not
a matter "incident to the underlying divorce" but merely a suit to enforce
34 1
a subsequent judgment.
I.

ENFORCEMENT

AND CLARIFICATION

Protective orders made in the course of divorce proceedings may be
kept in effect by the terms of the order for up to two years. 342 After one
year has passed, a protective order is subject to being vacated on motion
of a party. 343 If the order affects someone in confinement at the date the
order expires, the order is effective for another year after confinement
ceases. 344 Whether such orders are appealable is in dispute, 3 45 but the
majority of reported cases hold that they are appealable. The Dallas
Court of Appeals in Cooke v. Cooke346 followed those authorities, allowing an appeal despite its earlier unpublished opinion to the contrary:347 "[t]he disposition of the parties and issues, not the retention of
jurisdiction [to modify the order], determines the status of an order ....
[A] protective order rendered pursuant to the family code is a final, ap339. See Cearley v. Cearley, 544 S.W.2d 661, 666 (Tex. 1976).
340. Hathaway v. Gant, No. 05-01-00134-CV (Tex. App.-Dallas Feb. 25, 2002, no pet.)
(not designated for publication), 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 1436.
341. Id. at *3.
342. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 85.025(a)(1) (Vernon 2002).

343. Id. § 85.025(b).
344. Id. § 85.025(c).
345. James v. Hubbard, 985 S.W.2d 516, 517-18 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
pet.). There the court held that such orders are appealable whereas the Waco
court had held that they are not appealable. Norman v. Fox, 940 S.W.2d 401,
App.-Waco 1997, no writ). For other reported cases see Cooke, 65 S.W.3d 785,
App.-Dallas 2001, no pet.).
346. Cooke, 65 S.W.3d at 785.
347. Id. at 788 n.1.

1998, no
appellate
404 (Tex.
787 (Tex.
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34 8
pealable order as long as it disposes of all parties and all issues.
As in Zeolla v. Zeolla,349 the resolution of the ambiguity in the parties'
settlement agreement in Ansley v. Ansley 350 arose out of an event that
did not occur as had been anticipated and agreed. In Zeolla the divorcing
couple had agreed to the consequences of the husband's retirement at
sixty-five, whereas he then retired at fifty-seven. In Ansley the parties'
written agreement merely provided for a division of property. The divorce decree, which was rendered seven months later, defined the parties
right as of the date of the settlement without references to assets which
might have been acquired after that date. The Austin Court of Appeals
concluded that an ambiguity existed in the decree and that its clarification
was therefore required so that the assets in existence at division were
divided 1in accordance with the parties' agreement seven months
35
before.
Years after the judgment for divorce was entered in Bishop v.
Bishop,352 the ex-husband sought a post-divorce division of an undivided
interest in the property that had been the community family home. In
the divorce decree, the wife had been given occupancy of the home and
the husband was ordered to make monthly payments on the indebtedness
against the property. The ex-wife had later moved to Missouri and had
since leased the house to another. The ex-husband asserted that the extent of the ex-wife's time of residence had not been fixed in the decree
and therefore needed clarification, or the former community property
that had become a tenancy in common should be partitioned. The decree
provided that the mortgage payments should be paid by the ex-husband
through May 20, 2002 and thereafter by the ex-wife, that the property
could be sold by mutual agreement, and that all maintenance of the property and insurance on it should be paid by the ex-spouses equally. The
trial court had also decreed how the ultimate sale price should be divided.
The San Antonio Court of Appeals concluded that the decree had disposed of all interest in the house and was not ambiguous. 353 The appellate court therefore sustained the trial court's dismissal of the case to
divide the property for lack of jurisdiction but allowed severance of the
suit for clarification. It appears that no effort was made on the ex-husneed for clarification in this
band's part to show a need for partition. The
354
respect was therefore apparently in order.

348. Id. at 788.
349. Zeolla v. Zeolla, 15 S.W.3d 239 (Tex. App.-Houston

[14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied). For commentary, see Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, 53 SMU
L. REV. 995, 1051 (2000).
350. Ansley v. Ansley, No. 03-01-00241-CV (Tex. App.-Austin Aug. 30, 2002, no pet.)
(not designated for publication), 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 6364.

351. Id. at *23-24.
352. Bishop v. Bishop, 74 S.W.3d 877 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, no pet.).

353. Id. at 880.

354. In Marshall v. Priess, No. 14-00-01399-CV (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Jan.
31, 2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication), 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 648, an effort to
clarify a post-divorce order acceptable for processing as a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) dealing with retirement benefits failed as an effort to make substantial
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In re Sims 355 dealt with jurisdiction of a count to deal with a dispute
concerning enforcement of an agreement incident to divorce entered into
in Bexar County. The agreement had provided in some detail for the
disposition of the proceeds of the ex-husband's principal business interest
when that interest should be sold. On learning of its subsequent sale, the
ex-wife brought suit in Bexar County to enforce the agreement. Soon
afterward however, the ex-husband died in Medina County and a proceeding to settle his estate was brought in the probate court there. The
corporate independent executor of the estate then brought suit against
the ex-wife in the probate court for a declaration defining its duties to her
under the divorce agreement. In the Bexar County suit, the ex-wife asserted the jurisdiction of that court, which was denied. The ex-wife then
brought a mandamus proceeding in the San Antonio Court of Appeals.
The appellate court concluded that jurisdiction should lie in the court of
Bexar County by applying the rule that when a suit might be proper in
two counties, jurisdiction should lie where it was first filed as the court of
356
dominant jurisdiction.
The dispute in Adams v. BelP57 arose from an ex-husband's periodic
failure to see that his former wife receive her share of his military retirement benefits adjudged to her in 1980. An order holding him in contempt had been issued in 1984 for the ex-husband's failure to direct
disbursements to his ex-wife as ordered by the court. But confinement of
the ex-husband was suspended on the condition that he would pay all
arrears on a monthly basis. In 2001 the court again held the ex-husband
in contempt for failure to comply with the court's orders but again did not
issue a confinement order. The ex-husband appealed. The Eastland
Court of Appeals dismissed his appeal, pointing out that seeking a writ of
mandamus was his only remedy. Seeking a writ of habeas corpus, on the
other hand, is the only means of relief from an order of contempt but that
358
relief is foreclosed if there is no confinement.
J.

POST-DIVORCE DIVISION OF

UNDIVIDED COMMUNITY PROPERTY

In Doyle v. Schulz 3 5 9 the court undertook to review of a post-divorce
division of community property left undivided on divorce by applying the
same standard but not the same facts as the those used for division the
community property on divorce. Instead, the trial court founded its division on facts arising after the divorce and on the condition of the parties
changes in the prior court order. In another QDRO- case brought by the ex-wife against
her deceased ex-husband's heir failed as a collateral attack on an unambiguous QDRO.
Purvis v. Wallace, No. 05-01-00235-CV (Tex. App.-Dallas Apr. 4, 2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication), 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 2399.
355. In re Sims, 88 S.W.3d 297 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, no pet.).
356. Id. at 303-04.
357. Adams v. Bell, 94 S.W.3d 759 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2002, no pet.).
358. Id. at 760 (citing In re Long, 984 S.W.2d 623, 625 (Tex. 1999)); Rosser v. Squier,
902 S.W.2d 962 (Tex. 1995).
359. Doyle v. Schultz, No.05-01-00563-CV (Tex. App.-Dallas Jan. 9, 2002, no pet.)
(not designated for publication), 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 108.
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at the time of the post-divorce hearing. The division of the pre-divorce
community pension interest wholly favored the ex-wife. Because the exwife, who had brought the suit, had not shown the relative condition of
the parties and had improperly relied on evidence of the husband's
wrongful acts prior to divorce, the appellate court held in effect that the
ex-wife had not discharged
her burden of proof to establish entitlement
360
to the whole interest.
In Kadlecek v. Kadlecek36 1 the ex-wife brought suit fifteen years after
divorce. The parties had entered into a property settlement explicitly apportioning the husband's federal civil-service retirement benefits between
them but left unmentioned the surviving spouse's annuity. The divorce
decree had divided the retirement benefits to be received by the ex-husband and had provided that any community property not awarded should
be the property of the spouse in "possession or control" of that property.
Thus, the ex-wife might be said to have sought a clarification of the divorce decree on a division of an undisposed community property interest.
The Austin Court of Appeals held that the language of the decree did not
award the wife an interest in the survivor's annuity.362 The court went on
to say, however, that the "possession and control" language referring to
any undisposed community interest has been interpreted as dealing with
physical control3 63 and the survivor's annuity was left unmentioned in the
decree. 364 The appellate court held that the order of the district court
awarding the ex-wife a right to the survivor's annuity would stand as a
partition as an undisposed community property interest, but that the district court's order that the ex-wife's interest should pass to her children
went beyond the divorce decree and therefore amounted to a forbidden
365
modification of the divorce decree.

360. Id. at *11.
361. Kadlecek v. Kadlecek, 93 S.W.3d 903 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, no pet.).
362. Id. at 907.
363. Id. at 908.
364. In so holding the court referred to Carreon v. Morales, 698 S.W.2d 241, 242 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 1985, no writ).
365. Kadlecek, 93 S.W.3d at 909-10.
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